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“Concern for man himself and his safety must always for the chief interest of all
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by Eze Sunday
Anticipatory failure determination, abbreviated as AFD, is qualitative risk analysis
approach that is based on I-TRIZ, a Russian short form of theory of inventive
problem solving. Although this approach comprises two methods, AFD-1 and
AFD-2, which are methodically structured to capture failure scenario that has
occurred or predict and reveal future failures that have not occurred respectively,
it has shortcomings and weaknesses which are very important to address and
eliminate.
In this thesis, weaknesses and shortcomings of the approach are explored, AFD-1
and AFD-2 are modified, and new AFD method named AFD-3 is created. The
two modified AFD methods and newly created AFD-3 are based on SIVAI-TRIZ
which is extended form of I-TRIZ for solving inventive problem. The modified
methods and newly created AFD-3 offer higher degree of flexibility, effectiveness,
and empowerment to reveal, predict and capture system failure scenarios. SIVAI-
TRIZ body of knowledge is realized by applying system design approach to risk
analysis through embedding design structure matrix (DSM) and design matrix
(DM) of axiomatic design on AFD methods to address AFD shortcomings and
augment I-TRIZ body of knowledge.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In all walks of life and endeavors, primary concern for man is security of life and
protection of environment and other sources of livelihood. History has showed
that even early scientists and engineers made safety integral part of system design
even though risk science was not well developed at that time. This is evident
in one of Albert Einstein’s quotes “concern for man himself and his safety must
always for chief interest of technical endeavors.” By the quote, it becomes obvious
and can be easily concluded that Albert Einstein foresaw trend of risk science and
rhapsodized on the importance of incorporating philosophy of safety in all walks
of man’s life to make such quote.
Although the quote may seem ordinary, it carries details of evolution of risk science
and its importance to improve system engineering designs. Technical dissection of
the quote not only indicates that usefulness of a technical system and activity is
dependent on acceptable degree of safety but safety itself determines design and
creation of technical system, which has set frontiers for evolution of risk science
over the last two decades. The evolution can be traced in quantitative risk analysis
as well as qualitative risk analysis which anticipatory failure determination (AFD)
is a part.
1
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1.1 Thesis Background
Anticipatory failure determination (AFD) methods are new RA methods which
are methodized to either perform risk analysis or predict future failures of a sys-
tem. They are categorized into two versions, which are AFD-1 and AFD-2. The
two versions are superior to other RA methods because they are based on princi-
ples of TRIZ, an acronym for theory of inventive problem solving. In those two
versions, TRIZ principles are embodied which provide mechanism for using ana-
lytical approach to reveal scenarios rather than trail-and-error approach that is
evident in FTA, FMEA or HAZOP method. Use of analytical approach to reveal
failure scenario is strength of AFD methods.
Generally, AFD strength comes from two important steps: first step is localization
of region from which problem (failure) emanates in a system and second step is
using analytical approach to reveal failure scenario. In AFD, essence of using
analytical approach to reveal root causes of a problem is due to the fact that when
scenario is analytically revealed with variables (resources) of condition in which
the problem occurred, the revealed scenario carries information that can be used
to prevent the failure and improve system safety. The practice of using variables
of condition in which a failure occurred to reveal its scenario aligns with TRIZ
principle of resources [1].
1.1.1 Failure Localization in AFD Method
In AFD methods, problem formulation, description of system success scenarios,
and FMEA method are extensively used to localize failure in a system [1]. AFD
methods are structured in way that it is very important to formulate original
problem that occurred and state success scenarios to define system behaviors.
To formulate a problem (failure) that occurred in a system, it is required that
the problem must be explicitly described and variables of condition in which the
problem occurred be clearly stated to define problem boundary. To state system
success scenario, it is required that success scenario of each subsytem be stated to
describe phase behaviors and overall system behavior. After describing the prob-
lem (failure) and variables of condition in which the failure occurred, problem is
localized by comparing formulated problem with failure effect (of success scenar-
ios) as illustrated in figure 1.1. While comparing formulated problem with failure
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effect, any failure effect that matches the description of the formulated problem is
indicator of the failure source.
As illustrated in figure 1.1, AFD failure localization process is linear. As such, the
process is appropriate for a system which its subsystems are linearly connected
such as modular system. Although AFD failure localization process is appropriate
to localize failure in modular system since its subsystems are linearly arrayed and
connected, it lacks framework to localize failure in a system in which subsystems
are arrayed to facilitate efficiency or flows in different directions such as integral
system; as such, AFD failure localization process constitutes knowledge gap, which
must be addressed since today’s systems are as much modularized as they are
integrated according to research by Ho¨ltta¨ et al [2].
Notwithstanding the knowledge gap, what about system interactions between two
or among more than two subsystems? From system engineering point of view, a
system comprises many interrelated, interdependent components which are inter-
acting to deliver one or more goals. It is technically evident from the definition
that system behavior, structure, and form of connection depend on interactions
among components [2]. As such, neglect of system interactions in AFD failure
localization constitutes second knowledge gap.
1.1.2 Process of Revealing Scenario
In AFD-1 method, scenario is revealed through problem inversion, method identi-
fication, and solution specialization. Problem inversion means that a formulated
problem must be rephrased in such a way that analysis will be focused on how
to produce the problem. Method identification is a step towards solving inverted
problem; at this stage, general method of solving a formulated problem is identi-
fied through searching different database and other sources of information. When
the method is identified, resources used in the identified method are compared
with resources in the formulated problem. If resources that are used in the iden-
tified method are present in the problem (that occurred in the system), it means
that both problems belong to same problem abstract category and solution ab-
stract category (general solution) [2]. Then, specialization of the general solution
to particular solution to formulated problem can be done using details of problem
formulation, resources, and condition in which the failure occurred [1, 2]. In some
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Figure 1.1: AFD Failure Localization Process
cases where scenario cannot be fully revealed using available resources, ARIZ, al-
gorithm for inventive problem solving, is applied [1]. This is fully explained in
Appendix A.
In AFD-2 method, end states are identified by individually considering failure of
each subsystem assuming other remaining subsystems are functioning as desired,
which is typical FMEA method. The middle states are identified by consider-
ing system resources. What about end states and middle states that can appear
because of vulnerability of the subsystems or differential vulnerability of compo-
nents that are arrayed and connected in a subsystem? It is technically evident that
some parts can fail because of vulnerability of other parts to processes and system
resources [3]. Vulnerability analysis is crucial to reveal different possibilities of
failure initiation, but it is not considered in AFD-2 method for predicting future
failures (end states and middle states). Thus, omission of vulnerability analysis
also constitutes third knowledge gap of AFD methods.
To bridge the knowledge gaps, this research work covers spectrum of shortcomings
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that are inherited when AFD-1 and AFD-2 are used to perform risk analysis; in
the research work, AFD shortcomings, solutions to eliminate the shortcoming, and
modified AFD methods are presented. New method named AFD-3 is methodized
to link system failure or product failure to manufacturing system using design
structure matrix (DSM) and design matrix (DM) of axiomatic design. AFD-3 is
structured to capture human failure and ergonomic failure. I-TRIZ tool is extended
to SIVAI-TRIZ, to manage knowledge base of system interactions. The thesis is
organized as thus:
In Chapter 1, introduction, thesis background, thesis problem statement, and
thesis purpose are presented.
Literature review of theory of scenario structuring, AFD-1 and AFD-2 are pre-
sented in chapter 2. The concept of AFD that is presented is based Kaplan’s
work. In chapter 3, shortcomings that appear when AFD-1 and AFD-2 are used
are thoroughly explained along with good solutions to address them.
Template of modified AFD-1 is presented and explained in chapter 4; template of
modified AFD-2 is explained in chapter 5 and template of newly created AFD-3
is presented in chapter 6.
In chapter 7, examples are used to illustrates the modified AFD methods and
newly created AFD-3 methods. Conclusion and future work are also stated.
1.2 Thesis Problem Statement
Shortcomings are inherited in RA solution in which AFD methods are used be-
cause of knowledge gaps due to: neglect of system interactions, pretermission of
vulnerability analysis, and linearity of AFD failure localization.
1.3 Thesis Purpose
The primary focus of this thesis is to modify and methodize AFD to possess ca-
pabilities which can be used to localize failure in any complex system architecture
and reveal its scenario. AFD methods must be empowered with technical capa-
bilities to not only localize problem situated in any level of system architecture or
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capture failure due to component differential vulnerabilities, but to also capture
failure due to human error and poor ergonomic design. These purposive goals
can only be achieved when a solution that bridges the AFD knowledge gaps are
fabricated to technically address the shortcomings.
1.4 Significance of Thesis Research
There is technical need to structure RA methods that use system engineering
concept to predict and reveal failure scenarios. Such approach can reveal fail-
ures that are attributed to a system, augment design information, improve safety,
and increase knowledge of system interactions and behaviors. The following new
approaches are implemented to AFD to bridge the knowledge gaps.
In the newly modified AFD methods, design structure matrix (DSM) is embedded
in its templates to capture all flows, interactions, and emergent behaviors that
characterize mechanism of a system. The design structure matrix is used to trace
problem or predict future failures; DSM is essentially used to examine, localize,
identify or predict future problem in any level of system architecture irrespec-
tive of whether integrated system or modularized system. This tool characterizes
AFD methods with capability which can be utilized to predict future failures with
respect to flows, flow paths, and system behaviors.
Transformation method is imbedded in AFD methods to map design informa-
tion from design matrix (DM) of axiomatic design to DSM, which is essential to
empower AFD to capture failure due to human error or poor ergonomic design.
Also, vulnerability analysis is inclusive in AFD framework to create capability
with which to capture failures and failure propagation due to component differen-
tial vulnerability and system vulnerability to flow intensities and natural system
(environment).
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Risk analysis is discipline that demands high degree of expertise because of its
application in various endeavors, which abut engineering, research, business, reli-
ability, food safety, planning, military defense. In various field of engineering, risk
analysis is hallmark of decision making. It is subdivided into two branches; first
branch is centered on identification of failure and revelation of failure scenario.
Second branch is based on probabilistic calculation or estimation of metric value
with which decision is made. The former is called qualitative risk analysis and the
latter is called quantitative risk analysis. Although both are complement of each
other, qualitative risk analysis will take major part of this thesis. Quantitative risk
analysis will be slightly discussed merely to show complete blocks of RA analysis.
2.1 Quantitative Risk Analysis
Quantitative risk analysis, abbreviated as QRA in various literatures, is RA analy-
sis that is concerned with probabilistic calculation or estimation of likelihood that
an event can occur. This branch of risk analysis comprises three basic steps and
these are:
 finding what can go wrong,
 Probabilistic modeling or probability estimation of what can go wrong
 Consequence evaluation of ‘what can go wrong if they would occur. .
7
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The first, finding what can go wrong, is where more energy and time are invested in
RA analysis because it is a step in which list of what can go wrong are identified
and listed. FMECA, FTA, ETA and AFD are tools created for this purpose.
Probabilistic modeling or estimation is used to establish percentage of possibility
that what can go wrong can occur. Consequence evaluation is usually based on
number of deaths, damages that can be impacted by what can occur. FMECA,
FTA, ETA and AFD are mainly used for this purpose. Figure 2.1 below illustrates
these three steps using cryptographic system.
Figure 2.1: Simple Architecture of Cryptographic System
Figure 2.1 is an example of linear system with desired state, S0. The system can
only reach its state if all its subsystems reach their end states; otherwise, the overall
system cannot reach its state. For Example, mechanism would stop at machine1
if encrypting machine1 failed, and the same would happen if others failed. Any
failure of the subsystems must force system mechanism to different part or end
states. This is the basic principle on which FMECA, ETA, FTA, AFD and other
tools are based and it is called scenario structuring in risk analysis. Recurrent
process is applied in FMECA to determine scenario structure. In every instance
of finding failure using FMECA, it is commonly assumed that all subsystems are
functioning as desired with exception of one in order to examine and state failure
at level of the subsystem. This process is repeated for a number of components in a
system. This forward process generates n-number of scenarios, {S1, S2, S3,..,Sn},
for n-number of components, {C1, C2, C3,..,Cn}. The recurrent process of FMECA
is evident also in AFD, but AFD method is more powerful because it has forward
method and backward method of finding failures, which is combination of FMECA,
FTA, HAZOP, and ETA concepts.
Considering likelihoods Li and consequences Ci of the scenarios, risk of a system
can be stated as triplets:
Ri = (Si, Li, Ci) (2.1)
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2.2 Qualitative Risk Analysis
Qualitative risk analysis has been explained to an extent; its main purposes are
for revealing and identifying scenarios. It comprises many methods as indicated
and explained in the introductory part of this thesis. In this part, the methods of
qualitative risk analysis are explained as variant of theory of scenario structuring.
2.3 Principle of Scenario Structuring
Principle of scenario structuring is principle that explains failure mechanism. This
principle recognizes that a system consists of subsystems that make up its network
and a subsystem consist of components that are networked together; this principle
maintains that a system failure which is deviant from desired state, S0, occurs
because of failure of either subsystem or components, which happened as result
of emergence of unexpected interactions or negative impact of resources within
or outside the system. A Set of principles which are constituted in principle of
scenario structuring are detailed in the following.
2.3.1 Principle of Success State of a System, S0
This principle indicates that knowledge of an activity or system success, S0, is
prerequisite for analysis and must be stated at onset before performing RA anal-
ysis. System success is intended function or expected outcome of an activity in
this context. In practical sense, this principle suggests that before carrying out
risk analysis of either an activity or a system, knowledge of system architecture
and functions of subsystems (components) that make up a system are prerequisite
to start risk analysis; if it an activity, stages and their expected success scenarios
should be known and clearly indicated before performing RA analysis. Example
is given in the following.
With respect to principle of success state, carrying out risk analysis of rocket
launching as showed in the above depicted diagram needs that one should have
insightful knowledge of success scenarios of its phases and the activity of rocket
launching itself. Clearly stating and indicating success scenarios before starting
analysis defines boundary of a problem.
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Figure 2.2: Rocket Launching Stages [4]
According to principle of success scenario, factors that can be considered before
starting risk analysis are such as system architecture, functionalities of subsys-
tems, functionalities of components, robust subsystem, resilient subsystem, re-
liability block diagram (2-out-of-3 system, 3-out-of-5 system, et cetera), system
interactions, resources et cetera.
2.3.2 Principle of Initiation
This principles states that a subsystem (phase) failure has its end states which
is deviant from intended subsystem (phase) purpose. In other words, it means
that a subsystem or phase failure forces a system in which it is constituted to
depart from its path of success scenario. Such departure from intended path is
labelled end state in typical language of scenario structuring. This process of
failure mechanism is called initiation of event or Initiation of failures. Using figure
2.3 as example, a failure can emanate from any phase of rocket launching and each
end states are represented with triangular or circle dot. Principle of initiation is
well supported by typical FMECA analysis. It represents the forward process of
identifying failures in AFD method.
Chapter 2. AFD and Theory of Scenario Structuring 11
Figure 2.3: Principle of Initiation
2.3.3 Principle of Emanation
Principle of emanation states that there are outgrowths of scenarios from a branch
of initiating event right after failure initiation is completed. Scenario outgrowths
which grow out of a branch of initiating failure have scenario tree form. This is
illustrated in figure 2.4 showed below. Scenario outgrowths depend on architecture
of a system and events that occur after an initiating event; for instance, outgrowth
can emanate as result of barrier system positioned in a system to catch exception
after failure initiation is completed. Typical example is a watchdog barrier system
that is purposely built to monitor and close off hydrocarbon flow in crude-oil
production system. This kind of system prevents failure from occurring when
it functions as desired and forces the system mechanism to undesired state, but
benign end state. Two states of outgrowth from initiating events are benign end
state (BES) and harmful end state (HES).
2.3.4 Principle of Unending Cause-Effect
Every scenario has infinite number of link which extends indefinitely in both di-
rections; in other words, this principle indicates that traces of cause-effect chain
extends in both directions provided system interaction and time-dependent func-
tion cover area and abut points of boundary of system interaction. For example,
‘pipe break’ as an initiating event for hydrocarbon leak could be end state of
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Figure 2.4: Scenario Tree Emanating from Initiating Event
initiating event ‘too much pressure or too much temperature in a pipe’. The
cause-effect chain extends indefinitely in both directions.
This principle makes it certain that for every effect within an area or at boundary
of system interaction, there is cause within or outside peripheral of the area of
interaction. AFD and other RA methods embody this principle.
2.3.5 Principle of Subdivision
Every scenario that can be described with a finite set of words is itself a set
of scenarios; a scenario can be broken down into sub-scenarios. For example,
scenario “pipe break” can be broken down into “axial break,” “transverse break,”
“punctures,” and et cetera. Each type of pipe break is scenario itself because they
have distinct roots causes; for instance, ‘axial break’ has its root causes as well as
transverse breaks.
2.3.6 Pinch Point Principles
A scenario tree may have what is called pinch point which is a point at which
two points from upstream area of scenario tree meet. This principle states that
a pinch point is dependent on points that are located at upstream area of system
and subsequent points in the downstream area are dependent on pinch points. In
very concise and comprehensive form, this principles states that scenarios that
occurred in downstream are caused by what happened in upstream, but scenarios
that emerged in upstream depend on scenarios that occurred before them.
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Figure 2.5: Pinch Point in Scenario Tree [1]
2.3.7 principle of Resources
A system usually comprises subsystems which require resources to deliver their
outputs; in this case, resources that are required by system to deliver its function
can be called system promoting resources. As well, system has resources which
inhibit its function. The word ‘inhibit’ in this sense refers to resources that con-
tribute to system failure or stops a system from reaching its success scenario, S0.
This kind of resources that can stop a system from reaching success scenario, S0,
can be called system inhibiting resources.
Principle of resource states that any initiating event can only occur if and only
if inhibiting resources for producing that failure are in a system or within an
environment. Conversely, initiating event cannot occur if any resource is missing.
There must be complete number of inhibiting resources in vicinity of or within a
system for a failure to occur. This is one of TRIZ principles, which is explained
in chapter 1
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2.4 Methods of Revealing Scenarios
Principle of scenario structuring supports forward process and backward process
of creating end states. The flexibility of moving forward and backward in attempt
to produce end states is source of strength of RA methods. Backward process
and forward process of creating end states can be can be illustrated in following
method of revealing of scenarios:
 Forward process: identify all possible initiating events by paying attention to
each phase or subsystems and draw outgrowing tree from initiating events to
their end states.
 Backward process and forward process: identify crucial end states and draw
incoming and outgoing tree to each by applying the principle of unending
cause-effect.
 Backward process and forward Process: identify possible mid states (pinch
points) by focusing on inhibiting resources within and around a system and
draw incoming tree and outgoing tree to each.
2.4.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
Failure mode and effect analysis uses forward method of identifying scenario, which
is identifying initiating events by focusing on phases and subsystems. In the
method, forward process is applied by assuming that n− 1 components are func-
tioning as desired with exception of one component. An end state is registered
which reflects failure of the component that is not functioning. This process is
repeated for n number of components in a system until n number of end states
is obtained. FMECA is often applied in electronics and aerospace manufacturing
industries because it reveals scenarios that can occur when a component of ma-
chine fails which helps in building resilient systems or barrier that can withstand
and avert negative consequences. Practical approach of FMEA method is “work-
ing” through all components of a system and asking “what could happen if only
a component were not working when remaining components were functioning as
desired?” Repeatedly asking this question for each component of a system flushes
out effects of component failures.
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Although this method offer value to risk science, it does not satisfy requirements
for revealing and identifying complete scenarios (effects) that can occur as result of
component failures because system components are multitasked nowadays to meet
need of efficiency. Multitasking system in present technology segments system
function into a number of modes and phases of operation, which when integrated
equates desired success scenario of a system.
In the case of multitasked system which its operation is segmented into phases,
FMEA matrix method that takes into consideration total number of system com-
ponents and phases of system operations is used for revealing completes effects of
components failure on a system. The matrix method is showed below.
Figure 2.6: FMEA Matrix for Revealing Complete Scenarios [1]
Figure 2.6 reveals complete initiating events that can occur in multitasked sys-
tem in which its success scenarios are segmented into phases of operations. For
instance, taking out one initiating event from the matrix and performing forward
process and backward process will yield complete scenarios for the initiating event.
Repeating the forward and backward process will yield complete scenario of mul-
titasked system.
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2.4.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Fault tree analysis, abbreviated as FTA in different literature, employs second
method which is identifying crucial end states and drawing incoming and outgoing
trees to each scenario by applying principle of unending cause-effect – forward
process and backward process. In FTA analysis, simple way for finding group
of scenarios that contribute to appearing of an end state is by selecting the end
state and asking the question “How did the end state come about?” This question
stimulates mind to think about scenarios that contribute to appearing of the end
state. Repeatedly asking the question “How did an end state come about?” while
working downwards from each end state establishes FTA network. Those points at
which incoming and outgoing trees meet in the FTA network depicts relationship
among scenarios and these relationships are then diagrammatically translated into
diagram for vividness using logic gates.
2.4.3 Event Tree Analysis
Event tree analysis, abbreviated as ETA in literatures, uses the first method of
revealing and identifying scenarios. An advantage of ETA is that it is mainly
focused on a crucial path of outgrowths of scenarios and estimated probabilities
which are used as basis of calculating probability of occurrence of end states using
Bayesian theory. Also, this method applies indexing method of analysis because its
approach centers on analyzing and calculating probability that a path in scenario
tree can occur. EVT gives flexibility of assessing and calculating a metric values
that indicates probability of reach an end state using Bayesian probability.
2.4.4 Hazard and Operability Analysis
Hazard and operability analysis, shortened as HAZOP in various scientific liter-
atures, is mainly used to identify root causes of deviation from specification and
negative consequence of deviation in downstream of a system network. When a
system is designed, its components are designed in a way to deliver output to
subsequent component depending on network structure of a system. Mainly, the
delivered output can either be scalar or vector quantity which span from heat flux,
light intensity, temperature and et cetera. HAZOP is methodically structured to
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capture deviations of vector or scalar quantity between two nodes which is the
reason why such scenarios are addressed as middle states or mid states per se.
In HAZOP approach, forward process and backward process are applied by iden-
tifying middle states and working through entire upstream to identify root causes
and downstream to reveal consequences; for instance, typical HAZOP approach
identifies mid states such as lower air flow, higher heat flux, higher air flow, lower
heat flux in combustion chamber and work entire upstream and downstream of
each mid state to establish scenario trees using forward process and backward
process.
In HAZOP, matrix form can be used to extensively establish concept of finding
complete scenarios, which are mid states. In this case, system success scenario,
which is usually segmented into phases of operation, can be represented on hori-
zontal part of matrix and system components can be placed on vertical part; this
matrix representation provides flexibility to capture hidden scenarios which may
not be too obvious because of multitasking.
Figure 2.7: HAZOP Matrix Concept for Revealing Complete Scenarios
By system principle of operation, success scenario, S0, is reached if all phases are
completed successfully; conversely, system success scenario cannot be reached if a
mid state, MS(i, j), appears in a phase which can signal failure at a phase. Finding
complete scenarios requires taking each mid state of a phase, working upstream and
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downstream to identify root causes and consequences of mid-states respectively,
and drawing incoming and outgoing trees to mid states The above illustrated
approach show way of finding complete scenarios, {Si, Li, Ci}, in multitasking
system or multiphase operations using HAZOP.
2.4.5 Anticipatory Failure Determination Approach, AFD
Anticipatory failure determination, abbreviated as AFD, is method which is based
on theory of inventive problem solving and principle of resource, which are ex-
plained already in previous chapters. With respect to serving purposes of failure
analysis and failure prediction, AFD is subdivided into two groups – AFD-1 and
AFD-2. AFD-1 is structured for conducting failure analysis using theory of inven-
tive problem solving and AFD-2 is structured for performing failure prediction with
continual application of AFD-1 to reveal scenarios. These two versions of AFD
offer great value to risk management as they provide mechanism through which
failure scenario can be analyzed using forward method and backward method.
This will become obvious as their templates are presented and discussed in the
following.
2.4.6 I-TRIZ Based AFD-1 Template
This template embodies scheme of AFD thought-process cycle and solution by
abstraction that are explained in chapter 1. Only difference between both is slight
and negligible, which is AFD-thought process cycle is generic concept, but AFD-1
is methodically structured and specialized for failure analysis of a specific inventive
problem. The template is as shown below.
STEP 1: FORMULATE ORIGINAL PROBLEM OF SYSTEM
In this step, state name of a system and its purpose (success scenario); describe
a failure that occurred and describe condition that accompanied or in which the
failure occurred. Formulating original problem refers to giving details about the
failure that occurred without adding or removing any information; this means
that every attribute of the failure must be stated as it is without bias. Attribute
of failure is important to find and specialize solution to its inventive problem.
For example, C-fan is a fan installed to regulate temperature of electric cooker,
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which released smokes that have smell of burned coil and stopped functioning when
temperature of the cooker abnormally rose to 300 degree Celsius. In the example,
name of the system ‘C-fan’ and its purpose ‘regulation of temperature of cooker’
are stated. The failure ‘released smokes that have smell of burned coil and stopped
functioning’ and condition in which the failure occurred ‘when temperature of
cooker rose to 300 degree Celsius’ are also stated to formulate the problem.
STEP 2: IDENTIFY SYSTEM SUCCESS SCENARIO
In step two, identify system success scenario and its phases (subsystem). Focus
attention on its subsystem to ascertain functionality of its phases if the system
is modular architecture. Following phase sequence of subsystems reveals mecha-
nism of reaching success scenario. For example, success scenario of c-fan can be
identified as thus
Subsystem Success Scenario, S0
cable wire conducts voltage
armature rotates blades
blades breezing
STEP 3: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE
Localize the failure in this step; the simple trick to localize a failure in modular
architecture is to apply FMEA method since the target is to identify a phase or
subsystem in which the failure occurred. Using typical FMECA concept can flush
out region of a failure. For example, using the failure description ‘the fan released
smokes that have smell of burned coil and stopped function when temperature of
cooker abnormally rose to 300 degree Celsius’, it becomes obvious that the region
of the failure is ‘armature’ since this subsystem is made of coil.
Subsystem Success Scenario, S0
cable wire conducts voltage
armature rotates blades
blades breezing
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STEP 4: FORMULATE AND AMPLIFY THE FAILURE
Step 4.1:In this step, it is criterion to restate the problem in such a way that it
reflects attributes of inventive problem. This step is same with first step of solu-
tion by abstraction. An example is given in chapter 1 using differential equation.
Restating a problem to possess attributes of inventive problem is called problem
inversion in AFD and problem that has inversion attributes is called inverted prob-
lem. Typical approach of inverting a problem is starting with sentence preamble
such as ’it is important to produce . . . .’ or ’It is crucial to synthesize. . . .’
and ending the sentence with failure and condition that accompanied a failure.
For example, the failure of c-fan can be stated as thus:
it is important to produce release of smokes that have smell of burned coils
prior to c-fan stopped functioning UNDER condition of 300 degree Celsius tem-
perature of cooker.
A problem that is restated in this way is called inverted problem because the
way in which the problem is stated demands synthesizing a phenomenon of failure
rather guess from physical features that characterize a failure. Other essential
factors to recognize are resources. Having details about condition under which or
accompanies a failure and phase at which a failure occurred can flush out required
resources to produce phenomenon of a failure.
Step 4.2: amplify the inventive problem; amplification of inverted problem is
crucial to ascertain that probability of producing a phenomenon under a specified
condition with identified resources is close to unity, which signifies certainty. for
example, instead of producing release of smoke with burned-copper smell in an area
of c-fan armature, AFD approach suggests that the phenomenon of the failure must
be produced on the entire area, space and volume of C-fan armature with identified
resources under same condition that initiated the failure. Problem amplification
is a way to ensure likelihood of unity value for revealed scenario. If a failure
occurred rarely, the approach suggests producing its phenomenon “repeatedly” or
“constantly.”
STEP 5: SEARCH FOR SOLUTION
Fifth step suggests searching for solution to an inverted and amplified problem;
such searching needs one to search various database for information on how to
produce a phenomenon of a failure. This step is the same with step of mapping
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Figure 2.8: Changing a Problem to Inverted Problem [1]
problem abstract category to solution abstract category in the example ‘solution
by abstract using differential equation’ in chapter 1. Typical example is illustrated
in figure 2.9
STEP 5.1: Search for Obvious Solution
In step 5.1, search for any engineering field, science, or other endeavors in which
same process of a failure is intentionally realized. This step is in compliance
with Genrich Altshuller’s discovery that there are similar patterns of solution for
similar problem. Principal target of this step is to identify method of synthesizing
a phenomenon of failure.
STEP 5.2: Identify Resources
Producing a failure requires resources; this step suggests surveying and identifying
resources. Resources can be identified by surveying resources that are used in an
identified method of producing a failure phenomenon and checking for presence of
those resources in vicinity or region at which a failure occurred. If resources of
identified method are present in the system, it indicates that it is general solution
to the inverted problem, which is a way to benchmark phenomenon of system
failure with identified method of synthesizing the phenomenon. Reason for this
benchmarking is due to fact that resources used to intentionally produce a phe-
nomenon in an identified method can always be same with resources required to
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produce a failure. Two convectional approaches to survey and identify resources
are as thus:
 Find required resources for producing a phenomenon in an identified method
 Check for presence of those resources identified in the method in a system of
analysis
In real practice, AFD has software package that can help in surveying and iden-
tifying resources. While benchmarking and surveying resources, a solution to an
inverted problem may be flushed out by identified resources and method. If solu-
tion is not flushed out yet; then proceed to next step.
Figure 2.9: Process of Searching in AFD [1]
Step 5.3: Searching for the Failure Effect Using Available Resources
Because principle of resources states that resources that contribute to appearing
of an undesired event must be present within or around a system for an event to
occur, there must be one or more latent resource(s), which can be found in pe-
ripheral of a system. In this step, find most latent resource in category of physical
effect, chemical effect, or biological effect around or within the system which in
combination with most obvious resources can yield the phenomenon. AFD soft-
ware package can help in finding latent resources since it has I-TRIZ innovation
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software specialized for this purpose. If this step does not yield, solution, it shows
there are contradictions. Proceed to next step and apply ARIZ.
Step 5.4: Apply ARIZ, Algorithm for Inventing Problem Solving
In this step, reapply the I-TRIZ method by focusing on physical, chemical, bio-
logical or technical contraction that exist between what you have as result and
what you want to produce with respect to resources within or around the system
because after applying step 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 of AFD-1 template, resources which
are needed to synthesize the failure event should have been revealed; but contra-
diction may exist on how to realize the effect with available resources. This is
where ARIZ application comes in. The methodical approach of ARIZ is shown in
the below depicted flow chart.
Figure 2.10: Flow Chart for Algorithm of Inventive Problem Solving
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The figure 2.10 illustrates flow chart of methodical process of applying ARIZ to
solving secondary problem, tertiary problem or nth problem until solution is found.
Practically, ARIZ is recurrent approach of repetitively applying I-TRIZ for pro-
ducing a phenomenon. As showed in the figure 2.10, simple approach of I–TRIZ
is formulate a problem, identify a method by searching solution from repositories
of information, and synthesize a phenomenon with respect to identified method
using resources around a system. The first five steps of the flow chart is typi-
cally I-TRIZ method beside the step, recap the problem. ARIZ method for AFD
comprises these steps:
 Recap a problem
 Formulate secondary problem
 Formulate Ideal solution of the problem
 Search ways to achieve the solution
If the first the solution is completely solved, it means there is a latent resources
that should be found; then, formulate tertiary problem and continue in the loop
until solution is revealed.
STEP 6: HYPPTHESIZE THE SOLUTION AND VERIFY IT
In step 6, hypothesis of how a failure (problem) occurs is formulated and systematic
approach on how to prove validity of the hypothesis are stated and proved.
Step 7: CORRECT THE FAILURE
Present remedies for preventing or eliminating failure. Principle of maximum use
of resources is applicable here to correct a failure.
2.4.7 I-TRIZ Based AFD-2 Template
AFD-2 is failure prediction analysis. This method embodies framework that is
very important in safety system design as it shows forward method and backward
method of predicting all possible failures of a system before they occur, which is
crucial for preventing them before they impact damages. This method is recurrent
application of AFD-1 concepts. Its template is shown in the following.
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STEP 1: FORMULATE THE PROBLEM
In this step, formulate the problem, which can be stated as: predicting all possible
system failures and synthesizing the predicted failures. Importance of focusing
on predicting all possible system failures and synthesis those failures as original
problem in AFD-2 approach is due to necessity to predict them, synthesize them,
understand their mechanisms and prevent them before they occur.
STEP 2:DESCRIBE THE SYSTEM SUCCESS SCENARIO, S0
Describe system phases, success scenarios of its phases {Sp1 , Sp2 , Sp3 ,. . . ,Spn}, and
success scenario of the system, S0. This is similar to step 2 of AFD-1.
STEP 3: FORMULATE THE INVERTED PROBLEM
In this step, invert the problem as in AFD-1 template; in AFD-2, the inverted
problem should read as thus: “synthesizing all the possible failures that can appear
as result of the system interactions.”
STEP 4: FIND OBVIOUS IE, ES, and MS
Find obvious initiating events, harmful end states and mid states of the system by
applying concept of FMEA and HAZOP; applying the two RA methods reveals
most obvious initiating events {IEj}, mid-states {MSj}) and harmful end states
{HESj}; organize those {IEj}, {MSj}, and {HESj} in scenario trees for clarity.
STEP 5: FIND OR LOOK FOR LATENT FAILURES
Conduct survey of resources around and within the system and map out possible
resources that can cause system failures; then, find latent or unobvious failure sce-
nario by focusing on failure mechanism that can be initiated by those resources.
AFD software can help in conducting such survey because it has package special-
ized for that.
STEP 6: STUDY AFD CHECKLIST
In step seven, AFD-2 approach suggests studying checklists, which are embedded
in AFD software for possibility of finding scenarios. The scenarios that are found
in this step should be added to scenario tree. The AFD checklists are appended
for references.
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STEP 7: DRAW INCOMING TREES TO END STATES
Seventh step of AFD-2 template demands that you draw incoming trees to connect
the found initiating events, mid states, and end states, which is helpful for building
scenarios through which harmful end states can occur. Since AFD-2 purpose is to
find all possible failures and scenarios, try to identify other ways through which the
found events can occur; in this case, AFD software and ARIZ are good supports for
identifying other scenarios. In this step, worsen the harmful end states to whether
other scenarios can result from that. If some scenarios result from worsening the
HES’s, draw incoming trees to account for them in the scenario trees.
STEP 8: STATE CORRECTIVE MEASURES
In this step, use I-TRIZ operators to recommend measure.
Chapter 3
Shortcomings of AFD Method
So far, AFD methods have been presented except shortcomings that are inher-
ited when they are used to perform risk analysis. This chapter is dedicated to
discussion of AFD shortcomings and reasons why they occur in any risk analysis
in which the methods are used. Although there is no doubt that AFD method
is better than other RA methods because of its embodiment of TRIZ principle,
forward method, and backward method of searching scenarios in a system, it lacks
frameworks to address factors that are technically important such as system in-
teractions, modularity and integrality concept in system engineering, axiomatic
design, and vulnerability analysis. Shortcomings that emerge because of preter-
missions of such technically important factors in AFD method are discussed in the
following.
3.1 Omission of System Interactions
A system comprises a group of interrelated, interacting or interdepended subsys-
tems which are functioning and transferring information, scalar or vector quantities
among themselves to deliver a goal. In system engineering, a goal which a system
is designed to deliver determines its layers, architecture, and structure. This is
the reason some systems have one level form-form connections among their con-
stituents and others have more than one level form-form connections. In practical
sense, system form-form connection not only defines its operational mechanism
and failure mechanism, but it reflects function-form relationship, which makes it
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good basis for modeling and identifying what can go. As such, it is very important
to use system interactions as basis of modeling and identifying failures.
AFD methods are structured with assumption that a system has only one layer
of form-form dependency. Although this may be true for very few systems, it is
not reliable concept for many systems in use today. As systems are getting more
complex due to technical constraints, many systems have two or more layers which
their interactions cannot be captured by searching failures at phase level. In AFD
methods, search for failure sources is on first level of form-form dependency which
can be thought of as subsystem-subsystem layer, but the methods lack framework
to trace failure to lowest layers. For example, the two methods (AFD-1 and AFD-
2) highlight the need to state phases, success scenario and trace failure at the phase
level, but it is inaccurate from system engineering concept of modeling because a
failure that emerges at first layer (subsystem level) may be caused by failure in a
different layer of subsystem. It is more technically good practice to trace failure to
lowest layer of system architecture which is way to take function-form dependency
as well as form-form dependency into consideration.
In system engineering, a module is an independent chunk that is highly coupled
within, but only loosely coupled to the rest of the system. Present AFD templates
can only reveal what goes wrong in a loosely coupled part of a system (first level
of form-form dependency), but the templates lack frameworks to reveal what goes
wrong in highly coupled part of a system.
3.1.1 Remedy for Omission of System Interactions
This shortcomings due to neglect of system interactions can be eliminated by
paradigm shift. The two methods must be modified to accommodate failure anal-
ysis to the lowest layer through embedding system engineering tools such as design
structure matrix (DSM) in the methods to take system interactions into consider-
ation while performing risk analysis.
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3.2 Neglect of System Integrality
Century ago, complex system design was driven by business constraints because
system designers were focused on designing system that would be easier to de-
compose for easy maintenance and design reuse. To achieve these purposes, many
systems were built with respect to design axioms which suggest decoupling a sys-
tem, but system decoupling is not totally practicable today. Today’s complex
systems design is as much integrated as they are modularized because design is
driven by technical constraints and business constraints. This is supported by
research that was conducted by Solsa et al and Katja Ho¨ltta¨-Otto. This emer-
gence of system integrality is due to demand for mass efficient, power efficient or
fuel efficient systems, which are rather technical constraints. These technical con-
straints have made complex system possessed some degree of integrality as well as
modularity. Many scientific researchers have been intrigued to research and come
up with convincing evidences and models that back this postulation [2].
3.2.1 Modularity and Integrality
Sosa et al published interesting article on the need to ascertain whether a system
is integral or modular as it has great impact on interactions. In her published
paper, Sosa showed a method to identity whether complex system is modular or
integral using design structure matrix (DSM). In further research, Katja Ho¨ltta¨-
Otto researched and showed model for computing degree of system modularity
using DMS matrix to capture interactions in three ideal systems: fully modular
system, bus-modular system and integral system. The proposed mathematical
model is called Singular Modularity Index (SMI) in her published paper [2].
3.2.2 Singular Modularity Index
Katja Ho¨ltta¨-Otto quantified modularity of complex system using design structure
matrix to captures form-form dependency among components of ideal systems
such as fully modular system, bus-modular system, and fully integrative system.
She equated physical connections between two components such as contact zone,
energy flows, material flows, information flows and it commonalities with binary
digit ‘1’ and non-contact between two components with binary digits zero ‘0’;
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Figure 3.1: (a)Integral System (b) Bus-Modular System (c) Modular System
[2].
thus, obtaining matrixes of 7-by-7 order as each of the ideal systems have seven
components in its architecture. They performed singular value decompositions
on the three matrixes of those ideal systems and calculated singular values. The
singular values according to Katja Holtta are equal to square root of eigenvalues
of DMSTDSM [2].
DSMa =

0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0

DSMb =

0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0

DSMc =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0

In attempt to observe distinct form-form attributes of systems, Katja Ho¨ltta¨-Otto
sorted singular values in ascending order, normalized them with maximum singular
values and was able to come up with the model for calculating modularity. Using
the SMI model and nonzero fraction (NZF), she was able to categorize system
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into modularity and integrality, which is convincing evidence that today’s complex
systems share characteristics of modular system as well as integral system.
SMI =
1
N
argminΦ
N∑
i=1
|αi
α1
− exp 1−iΦ | (3.1)
NZF =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
DSM(i,j)
N(N − 1) (3.2)
NZF model is used to calculate how connection within a chunk sparsely distributed
within a chunk. In her result depicted in figure 15, she demonstrated that jet
engine (9), MR injector (11), CT injector (5) and powertrain (14) have higher
degree of integrality than modularity, which indicates that complex system is not
fully modular as AFD approach assumes
Figure 3.2: Graph of Modularity Verses Sparsity for 15 Products [2].
With respect to SMI model, higher degree of integrality means that components
are more highly coupled than loosely coupled in today’s complex system. In other
words, there are more densely interconnections among components of complex
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system. In this case, Ho¨ltta¨-Otto’s model and results are good basis to address
neglect of integrality in AFD methods.
3.2.3 Remedy for Neglect of System Integrality
Many functions are allocated to a component in integral system, but one function
is allocated to a component in modular system. Components are densely con-
nected in different layers in integral system, but components are highly coupled
in chunks (modules) and chunks are loosely coupled at subsystem level. As such,
imbedding DSM in AFD methods is technically proficient to take integrality as
well as modularity into consideration while using AFD method to perform RA
analysis.
3.3 Pretermission of Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability analysis is degree of responsiveness of system and its constituents to
natural system around them. Vulnerability occurs because of interactions between
natural system and artificial system. Natural system is system which we cannot
dictate – it is the system we live in. Artificial system is manmade system designed
with respect to law of nature to deliver expected output; for example, automobile
is designed for conveying people from one place to another by establishing design
tradeoff between friction verse engine power; ship is designed to transport goods
and people from one place to another by establishing tradeoff between weight verses
buoyant force and current verses engine power. System engineering design has
always been about designing man-made system to function with natural system;
this is evident in axiomatic design principles.
In engineering design, synergy is a major challenge. Synergy is very difficult to
address during system design because of complex interactions between artificial
systems with natural system. This problem is evident in common engineering
quotes “summation of parts in a system is less than system behavior.” This system
property is called emergent behavior. Such behavior is emergent because it is
unexpected since it is not taken into consideration during design. This is another
problem which AFD is not structured to capture.
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AFD is potent RA method that has potential to reveal a number of system fail-
ures due to emergent behavior, but it is not methodically structured to cover total
spectrum of risk analysis since its framework lacks vulnerability analysis. For
example, AFD approach neglects subsystem architecture and component vulner-
abilities, but directs analyst’s thinking on failures of subsystems. This present
paradigm of AFD approach neglects responsiveness of components to physical
processes around them. This neglect is due to assumption in AFD that system
comprises only first level form-form interconnection as it treats subsystems ele-
mental component of a system. This paradigm on which AFD methods are based
has potential of springing up surprises that will be very damaging. For example,
let’s suppose figure 3.4 is architecture of a system.
Figure 3.3: Engineering Concept of Product Design
Figure 3.4: Example of System Architecture
Typical AFD approach focuses analysis on chunks which are big, thick black boxes
as in figure 17, but neglects interconnected components in chunks and physical pro-
cesses which take place in them. This paradigm of focusing analysis on chunks
while neglecting internal structure, interconnected components, and physical pro-
cesses that take place in chunks can only capture scenarios that take place outside
chunks and reveal scenario tree as depicted in figure 3.5, which is deficient of
scenarios that emanate from interconnected components and physical processes
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encapsulated in chunks. A sophisticated AFD method must reveal complete sce-
narios as illustrated in figure 3.6.
Figure 3.5: Basic Scenario Tree of Figure 3.4 Using AFD Approach
Figure 3.6: Scenario Tree of Figure 3.4 Considering all Parts
3.3.1 Remedy for Pretermission of Vulnerability Analysis
A system comprises arrayed, interconnected components at its different levels of
form-form connection, so it practically technically sufficient to imbed vulnerability
analysis in AFD methods. Vulnerability analysis must take holistic approach and
consider these:
 Multiple interacting physical processes (perturbation, stress or stressor) and
chain or sequence of their interactions,
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 Responsiveness of components and subsystem when exposed to perturbation
or stressor and effects of exposure,
 The sensitivity and resilience of a system and its parts to physical processes
(natural system),
 Checking for differential vulnerability because components and subsystems
are not equally vulnerable to physical processes,
 Check for stochastic and non-linear elements within or outside a system,
which could spring surprises, and
 Connect cause-effect links in scenario tree.
3.4 Neglect of Axiomatic Design Framework
Axiomatic design framework is framework of managing knowledge of system in-
teractions from design phase through its life cycle. This framework of managing
knowledge of system interactions is created by mapping Design matrix of axiomatic
design (DM) to design structure matrix (DSM) to combine strengths of both tools
in order to eliminate difficulty and avoid subjective way of managing knowledge
of system interactions during system design. In system engineering, DM is used
to capture interactions among functional requirements (FR’s) and design parame-
ters (DP’s). DSM is used to capture interactions among components of a system.
Transformation is used to map information from DM to DSM to link knowledge
and design decision made during design with component interactions. Mapping of
DM to DSM provides linkages among functional requirements, design parameters,
manufacturing processes, products and its components, which provide basis to
trace failure from a component through manufacturing process and design phase.
AFD is weak approach when problem of risk analysis is concerned with revealing
failures due to human errors and bad ergonomic design; this AFD weakness is
due to lack of system knowledge management framework in AFD approach, which
can link system unintended behavior and attributes to manufacturing process and
design parameters. These linkages among the four domains provides basis to iden-
tify a failure in one domain and trace its root causes in other domains since an
organized methodology is employed in industry, which encompasses translating
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customer requirements to functional requirements, mapping functional require-
ments to design parameters, and mapping design parameter to process variables
in order to manufacture a product. This methodology of design is often carried
out using design matrix of axiomatic design (DM), quality function deployment
(QPD), and design structure matrix (DSM).
Figure 3.7: Axiomatic Design Framework
The QFD is applicable to the first phase of axiomatic design framework to translate
customers’ needs to functional requirements. Design matrix of axiomatic design
is used to map functional requirements to the physical domain while considering
relationships between functional requirements and design parameters. By zigzag-
ging thought process of design, functional requirements and design parameters are
equally split in number, so that row and column of DM matrix must be equal.
According to axiomatic design, functional requirements are independent set of
requirements that characterize product needs; design parameters are parameters
that characterize design that meets functional requirements; process variables are
manufacturing processes by which a design parameter are created. The relation-
ships between two domains can be captured in matrix and map from one domain to
the other using transformation method. In axiomatic design framework, mapping
from one domain to another carries history of organizational decisions, technical
decision, processes which are applied during design and creation of a product.
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 X O O O
FR2 X X O O
FR3 X X X O
FR4 X X X X
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DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 X O O O
FR2 O X O O
FR3 O O X O
FR4 O O O X
Figure 3.8: Zigzagging Process of Decomposing FR to DP [5]
As illustrated in the two tables above, relationships between functional require-
ments (FR’s) and design parameters (DP’S) can be captured using DM. The boxes
which are marked with letter ‘X’ show relationship between FR’s and DP’s and
the boxes that are marked with ‘O’ show that FR’s does not have relationship
with DP’s. This is typical guide of complex system design that is supported by
design axioms, which can be thought as register for storing relationships between
DP’s and FR’s.
Feasibility of using axiomatic design framework as means of revealing failures is due
to possibility of transforming information captured by DM to DSM which provides
basis to identify problem and trace its root causes in any of the linked domain
in framework for managing system knowledge, since DSM serves as repository
for storing and assessing knowledge of system interactions . Clear thinking that
supports proposition of axiomatic design framework as a means through which
AFD methods can be empowered to identify human error and reveal its scenario
is because the knowledge management framework can store system interaction,
management decisions, technical decision, and technical processes which are taken
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during manufacturing a product. For example, figure 3.9 shows possibility of
tracing product failure in any of the four domains by mapping information from
DM to DSM or vice versa [6].
Figure 3.9: Framework for Managing System Knowledge [6]
3.4.1 Transformation of DM to DSM
Transformation of axiomatic DM to DSM provides basis and means to analyze
a system, identify source of design problem, and trace through design domain or
process domain to pinpoint source at which a failure emanates, which is important
to address system emergent behavior. Boeing 787 is typical example to illustrate
strength of basis provides by mapping DM information to DSM. Boeing 787 de-
veloped electrical problem after being manufactured, assembled, and delivered. In
aviation industries, people were expecting Boeing to respond fast, but Boeing was
unable to give out any information pertaining to the problem because they could
not identify the source of the problem. This kind of difficulty can be averted by
maintaining and managing knowledge of system interactions appropriately and
linking them with risk analysis method. In this kind of problem, DM transforma-
tion to DSM will provide analysts with compact framework and knowledge base
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of system interactions with which source of a problem can be spotted and trace
through the five domains of framework for managing system knowledge [6].
The transformation method stems from power of substitution method in solving
system of linear equation [6]. It is obvious that expressing a variable in terms
of other variables in a function while solving system of linear equations reveals
relationship among variables; for example:
8y = 10x+ 9 (3.3)
10y = 7x+ 19 (3.4)
Expressing x variable in terms of y variables still retains relationships between x
and y. This is simple basis upon which transformation of axiomatic DM to DSM
is based since DM possesses attributes of system of linear equations as showed in
axiomatic design principles.
x =
8y − 9
10
(3.5)
x =
10y − 19
7
(3.6)
3.4.2 Essential Step to Transforming DM to DSM
As mentioned earlier, design matrix of axiomatic design (DM) has characteristics
of system of linear equations, which in this case, describe relationships among
functional requirements and design parameters; for example, 4-by-4-order matrix
showed below can be used as an example.
FR1 = α1,1DP1 + α1,3DP3 + α1,4DP4 (3.7)
FR2 = α2,1DP1 + α2,2DP2 + α2,4DP4 (3.8)
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FR3 = α3,1DP1 + α3,2DP2 + α3,3DP3 (3.9)
FR4 = α4,2DP2 + α4,3DP3 + α4,4DP4 (3.10)
Matrix− in− SLE − Form︸ ︷︷ ︸
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 α1,1 0 α1,3 α1,4
FR2 α2,1 α2,2 0 α2,4
FR3 α3,1 α3,2 α3,1 0
FR4 0 α4,2 α4,3 α4,4
Matrix− in−DM − Form︸ ︷︷ ︸
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 X O X X
FR2 X X O X
FR3 X X X O
FR4 O X X X
First Step: create a DM matrix of a system; for example, DM matrix of system
of linear equations showed above is used.
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 X O X X
FR2 X X O X
FR3 X X X O
FR4 O X X X
Second Step: choose output variables in the matrix such that only one cho-
sen output variable will occupy one row and column of the matrix; for example
the output variables of the DM matrix are chosen as shown below. the Xs in
rectangular boxes are chosen output variables.
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DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 X O X X
FR2 X X O X
FR3 X X X O
FR4 O X X X
Third Step: For every DM matrix with chosen output variables, there is unique
permutation matrix. Permute the rows of DM matrix in such a way that the
output variables occupy the diagonal of the matrix. The matrix obtained after
permuting DM matrix is DSM matrix; for example, the permutation matrix of the
DM matrix is:
Permutationmatrix =

0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 X O X X
FR2 X X O X
FR3 X X X O
FR4 O X X X
The product of the permutation matrix and DM matrix is DSM matrix: row
permute the DM matrix by multiplying columns of DM matrix with rows of per-
mutation matrix as shown in equation 3.11
DSM = Permutationmatrix.DM (3.11)
Transformaton method is started with DM matrix (FRs vs DPs) and ended with
DSM matrix (DPs vs DPs).
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
DP1 X X X O
DP2 X X O X
DP3 X O X X
DP4 O X X X
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Transformation of the matrix from axiomatic DM (FRs versus DPs ) to DSM
(DPs versus DPs) provides knowledge base for analyzing interactions among de-
sign parameters and interactions among functional requirements. Since DSM is
repository of system behaviors, the value of this transformation method is that it
offers flexibility of employing DSM which is suitable for analyzing and spotting
design failure in a system
3.4.3 Remedy for AFD Weakness to Human Failures
AFD methods do not have capability to trace failure from product emergent be-
havior to manufacturing process variables, which is the reason its methods are
weak in identifying and revealing failure due to human errors and bad ergonomic
designs. The only means through which such capability can be created in AFD
is imbedding DM and DSM matrix which their information can be mapped from
one to the other.
Chapter 4
SIVAI-TRIZ Based AFD-1
AFD-1 method that is based on I-TRIZ and specialized for failure analysis has
been discussed and explained including theory of scenario structuring in chapter
2. In chapter 3, shortcomings of AFD are elaborated, which encompass neglect of
system interactions, pretermission of vulnerability analysis, and neglect of system
integrality due to assumptions of AFD method that system and phases of an activ-
ity are always modular or linearly networked. AFD-1 approach to failure analysis
will be remodeled to take those listed omissions into consideration to empower the
tool to trace failure to lowest form-form connection of a system. Design structure
matrix (DSM) is embedded in SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD approach, which offers
compact framework and knowledge base for analyzing system interactions. The
strength of this new AFD-1 method is that it can offer flexibility to trace failure
to lowest part of systems whether integral or modular.
4.1 SIVAI-TRIZ Based AFD-1 Template
Modified AFD-1 template that is explained below is based on SIVAI-TRIZ. SIVAI-
TRIZ is an acronym that is coined from system interactions, vulnerability analysis,
innovation, and theory of inventive problem solving, which is extended form of I-
TRIZ. This new approach is antithetical to AFD assumption that complex systems
are always modular or activity phases are always linearly networked, which is the
reason why practical paradigm that complex systems are much integrated as they
modularized is neglected in AFD. This new approach distorted the AFD paradigm
and technically methodized the practical paradigm which flushes out possibilities
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of having different forms of scenario depending on system architecture. Template
of the new AFD method is presented in the following.
STEP 1: FORMULATE THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM
In this step, formulate the ”original problem”. Here, stating original problem refers
to naming the system, indicating the purpose for which it is made, and describing
the failure. The failure description must contain definition of four variables which
characterize problem boundary, which are system failure, condition, season
and place in which the failure occurred.
Example, MKF radiation pyrometer is a device designed to sense temperature of
a distant object. The pyrometer started displaying inaccurate readings of mea-
surement when it was used in cloud of dust particles during Harmattan season in
Sub-Sahara Africa.
The failure description shown above satisfies the requirements that a problem must
contain four variables that characterize a problem of system; such as system
failure started displaying inaccurate measurement, condition in cloud of dust
particles, season Harmattan, place Sub-Sahara Africa Each of these variables
carries important details for specializing solution to the problem.
STEP 2: IDENTIFY ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS SCENARIO
Identify subsystems, inputs, functions, and their outputs. In the case of an activity,
identify the phas and desired results that are expected to be accomplished at each
phases. Essence of this step is to gain familiarity of system in question.
Here, pyrometer block diagram is used as an example.
Figure 4.1: Block Diagram of Radiation Pyrometer
Subsystem Inputs Output
Optical System infrared energy energy
Sensor converged infrared signal
Temperature Indicator analog signal readings digital readings
Data Transmitter digital data data
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Subsystem Function
Optical System sends converged Infrared energy
Sensor detects and sends infrared energy as analogue signal
Temperature Indicator Reads and Displays measurements
Data Transmitter Transmits data
STEP 3: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE
Step 3.1:Map Subsystem Dependencies to DSM
Map subsystem dependencies to DSM matrix since system at its first level com-
prises a set of subsystems that are coupled together. Important things to bear
in minding while mapping system dependencies to DSM matrix are recognition of
where there are vector flows in a system and directions which they flows. Vec-
tor flow between two subsystems can be represented with characters ‘X’ and no
flow between two subsystems can be represented with ‘O’; then localize the failure
using DSM matrix because it has compact information about system interactions
Using example shown above, system interactions in pyrometer block diagram can
be mapped to DSM matrix as shown below. Interactions can flow from up to
down, which means subsystem from which a vector flows should be represented on
columns of DSM matrix and the other to which a vector flows should be represented
on rows of the matrix.
O
p
tical
S
y
stem
sen
sor
T
em
p
eratu
re
In
d
icator
D
ata
T
ran
sim
itter
Optical system O O O
Sensor X O O
Temperature Indicator O X O
Data Transmitter O O X
Strength of flow between two subsystems can be represented in DSM matrix by
varying values between zero and one.
Chapter 4. Extended AFD-1 Method 46
O
p
tical
S
y
stem
sen
sor
T
em
p
eratu
re
In
d
icator
D
ata
T
ran
sim
itter
Optical system 0 0 0 0
Sensor 1 0 0 0
Temperature Indicator 0 1 0 0
Data Transmitter 0 0 1 0
Now, different analysis can be performed on DSM matrix such as DSM partition-
ing. Degree of modularity and form of system failure scenario tree can be checked
using SMI model. SMI greater than 0.99 means that system is modular and has
s-shaped scenario tree; SMI less than 0.99 shows that system has shape of scenario
tree, which is different from s-shape
Steps to Calculate SMI
Create Matrix of a System: this is square matrix of n-by-n order, where n is the
number of subsystems, components or basic elements that are connected in a level
of system architecture. Example, matrix of radiation pyrometer is 4-by-4 order
because there are n-subsystems in the first level of the system architecture.
DSMP =

0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0

DSMS = DSMPDSM
T
P (4.1)
Calculate eigenvalues λ1, λ2, λ3 . . . λn of the DMS.DMST and singular values
which are square roots of the eigenvalues of a system, α1 =
√
λ1, α2 =
√
λ2, α3 =√
λ3 . . . αn =
√
λn.
Calculate SMI using α1, α2, α3, . . . αn. This can be done iteratively using equa-
tion 3.1.
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 SMI > 0.999 implies that analysis can be based on system phases without
loss of important information.
 SMI ≤ 0.99 implies some important information will be lost if analysis is
based on system phases only. Use SIVAI-TRIZ approach in this case.
Step 3.2: Identify the Failure
Use information captured by DSM as knowledge base to identify subsystem at
which the failure occurred through analyzing subsystem interactions.
Using pyrometer problem as an example, problem of the system is localized at
interaction between optical system and sensor.
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Optical system O O O
Sensor X O O
Temperature Indicator O X O
Data Transmitter O O X
NOTE! Step 1 to step 3 can be repeated until the basic element at which the failure
emanated is identified. The idea is to apply systematic approach by firstly identify
a problem at first level of form-form dependency (subsystem level), second level
of form-form dependency (component level), and then third level of form-form
dependency (basic element level) at which the problem originates. How many
times step 1 to 3 can be repeated until problem is identified at basic element level
depends on system architecture.
STEP 4: FORMULATE THE PROBLEM AT SUBSYSTEM LEVEL
Formulate the problem at subsystem level with respect to the four variables of
system failure.
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Example, MKF optical system is a system that converges infrared energy from
hot body to sensor ; it appears dusty and partially converges infrared energy when
it was used in cloud of dust particle in Harmattan season in Sub-Sahara Africa.
Now, it can easily be noticed that there are five variables that define a problem at
this level. Additional variable here is appearance dusty of the subsystem.
STEP 5: IDENTIFY ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS SCENARIOS
define component functions, Inputs, and success results (outputs). This is same
with step 2. The number of subsystems, components, basic elements that can be
identified here is n+1. Every subsystem, component or basic element has a part
that connects it to the rest of the system. Reconsider that part in this step, so that
information cannot be lost. As such, function-form dependency is re-identified.
Example: Using the block diagram of optical system at which the failure occurred
in the first form-form dependency, component function can be identified as in step
2. Five components can be identified in the block diagram besides hot object as
illustrated in figure 4.2
Figure 4.2: Schematic of Optical System [7]
Components Inputs Output
Front Lens infrared energy converged infrared energy
Mirror converged infrared energy reflected infrared energy
Middle Lens converged rays diverged rays
Back Lens diverged rays converged rays
sensor converged infrared energy electrical signal
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Component Function
Front Lens Converges infrared energy to mirror
Mirror reflects converged infrared energy to sensor
Middle Lens diverges rays to back lens
Back Lens converges rays to eye piece
Sensor convert infrared to electrical signal
STEP 6: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE AT COMPONENT LEVEL
Step 6.1: Map component dependencies to DSM
Map component dependencies to DSM as showed in step 3. Details in step 3 can
be repeated at this step.
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Back Lens X O O O
Middle Lens O X O O
Mirror O O X O
Front Mirror O O O O
Sensor O O X O
Calculate SMI Model
Use matrix of component at which the failure emenated, equation 4.1 and equation
3.1 to calculate SMI as showed in step 3.
Example the matrix of optical system from which the failure originated in pyrom-
eter is as shown below
DSMP =

0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0

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Identify the Problem at Component Level
Use the DSM matrix that has compact information about interactions in a com-
ponent to identify the source of problem at this level of system architecture.
For example, failure of pyrometer fall at the interactio between front lens and
mirror as shown below.
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Back Lens X O O O
Middle Lens O X O O
Mirror O O X O
Front Mirror O O O O
Sensor O O X O
FORMULATE THE PROBLEM AT BASIC ELEMENT LEVEL
Formulate the problem at third level of form-form dependency (basic elements of
the system).
Example, MKF front lens is a basic element that Converges infrared energy to
reflector (mirror); MKF front lens unevenly converges infrared energy when it was
used in cloud of dust particle in Harmattan season in Sub-Sahara Africa.
STEP 8: INVERT AND AMPLIFY THE PROBLEM AT THIS LEVEL
Apply typical I-TRIZ approach –invert and amplify failure; reformulation, inver-
sion and amplification of the problem should be done in manner that supports
thinking on how to synthesize the failure rather than guess possible causes from
physical attributes of failure.
Example, formulate the problem at this third level of form-form dependency (basic
elements of the system). this can be done as thus: It is crucial to produce dusty
particle on the lens and its uneven convergence of infrared energy to reflector
(mirror).
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Amplify the problem as thus: it is crucial to produce dust particle on the lens and
its uneven distribution of infrared energy on the entire lens area.
STEP 8: SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
Use I-TRIZ database and other sources of information to find out area of discipline
where such failure is intentionally produced. This is a guide to identify necessary
information about resources and method of producing the failure. This needs
intense search of information in various databases. I-TRIZ software offers help in
this regard.
STEP 8.1 Search for Resources
 Identify resources required for realization of the phenomenon.
 Find necessary resources in the system and its surrounding.
Step 8.2: Use the Resources to Produce the Failure
Use the resources found around or within the system and identified method to
synthesize the failure. If it fails, it indicates that there is missing resources. Iden-
tify the missing resources and try to generate it from the present resources. If the
resources cannot be generated from the present ones, proceed to step 8.3.
Step 8.3: ARIZ (Algorithm for Inventing Problem Solving)
Apply ARIZ to reveal a way of synthesizing the problem. ARIZ is explained in
detail in chapter 2 of this thesis.
STEP 9: FORMULATE HYPOTHESIS AND VERIFY IT
In this step, formulate hypothesis about how the problem occurred and verified
its validity.
STEP 10: CORRECT THE FAILURE
Prescribe corrective or eliminative measures for the failure.
Chapter 5
SIVAI-TRIZ Based AFD-2
SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-2 is methodized for predicting and revealing system fail-
ures. DSM matrix and vulnerability analysis are applied in this method to predict
and make list of possible failures in order to reveal failure scenarios and recommend
corrective measures. It is sophisticated RA tool for improving system quality be-
cause it captures total number of system interactions in a DSM compact frame,
which offers bases with which possible failures can be identified, revealed and
corrected. The template is as shown in the following.
5.1 SIVAI-TRIZ Based AFD-2
Three prominent approaches of this sophisticated RA tool encompass predicting
possible future failures, revealing their scenarios, and correcting or eliminating
their negative impacts to improve safety standard of a system. In this method,
I-TRIZ principles and ARIZ are repetitively applied to list of future failures(IEs,
MDs, and ES) to reveal their scenarios. Repetitively applying I-TRIZ principles
and ARIZ is recurrent process of searching failures and revealing their scenarios,
which is very crucial to enhance safety.
STEP 1: STATE THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM
Define the system in this step: state its name and purpose; for example, system
[A] is designed and created for [state purpose which it serves]. The main aim of
this analysis is finding all future failures that can occur as result of using it and
identifying their scenarios for recommending corrective measures.
52
Chapter 5. Extended AFD-2 Method 53
STEP 2: IDENTIFY SYSTEM SUCCESS SCENARIOS
This step is same as showed in step 2 of SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-1. Reference can
be made to chapter 4. State system inputs and outputs and define their functions.
STEP 3: GATHER SYSTEM INFORMATION Gather system information
through reading system manuals, its block diagram and operation mechanism.
STEP 3.1: Map System Schematic to DSM Matrix
Map dependencies to DSM: system dependencies can be mapped to DSM by iden-
tifying both vector flows and component to which it flows. The flows can be
mapped to DSM.
Example, these are vector flows in optical system that is used as example in
chapter 4.
Mirror → Sensor
Front Lens → Mirror
Mirror → Middle Lens
Back Lens → Eye Piece
Middle Lens → Back Lens
It can be mapped to DSM as showed in the matrix below. The information flows
(vector flows) are represented in such a way that they flow from columns to rows
of the matrix
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Back Lens X O O O
Middle Lens O X O O
Mirror O O X O
Front Mirror O O O O
Sensor O O X O
Chapter 5. Extended AFD-2 Method 54
Identify undesired interactions and survey required resources: in the DSM matrix,
identify desired interactions between two interacting components and use it to
identify possible failures that can result from the interactions. List these possi-
ble failures for every interaction between two components in DSM matrix. The
practice of using desired interactions to identify undesired interactions and survey
required resources is in alignment with ideality principle.
Step 3.2: Check Scenario Structure of the System
Check scenario structure of the system (Hint: use SMI equation 3.1 as showed in
chapter 4) to know whether the system has s-shaped scenario tree.
Step 3.3: Catalogue the IE’s, MD’s, and ES’s
Archive the initiating events, middle states and end states. Catalogue them with
respect to components of the system or activity phases.
Connect IE’s, MD’s, and IE’s to Scenario Tree
Initiating events (IEs), mid states ( MDs), and end states ( ES’s) can be sys-
tematically connected in scenario tree. This is can be done according to scenario
structure implies by SMI model. For example, if SMI is unity, scenario tree is s-
shaped. If it is not unity, scenario tree has different form that depends on system
architecture.
STEP 4: INVERT AND AMPLIFY THE PROBLEMS
Invert and amplify catalogued failures in such a way that their phenomena can
be synthesized rather than examine and conclude based on physical attributes of
failures as in traditional risk analysis. What is explained and detailed in chapter 4
about problem inversion and amplification is same with this step.
STEP 5: IDENTIFY METHODS AND SURVEY RESOURCES
Identify methods: search various branch of learning, engineering, science, et cetera
where phenomena of the future failures are intentionally produced. This is same
with mapping problem abstract category to its solution abstract category as ex-
plained in chapter 1.
Identify resources: catalogue resources used in the methods and Identify resources
that are present in the system. Find a way to produce failure using the resources.
This step is same with step 7 and step 8 of SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-2 in chapter 4.
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STEP 6: VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
Step 6.1: Gather Information about Sensitivity of System
Gather information about responsiveness of system parts to resources around or
within them and possible failures that can results when they are stressed beyond
safety limits and cannot regain their functions.
Step 6.2: Survey All Resources
Identify resources and isolate perturbations, stressors or stress to basic elements,
components, and subsystems of system.
Step 6.3: Survey Interactions among Peturbations
Survey interactions among stressors; two or more perturbations may interact to
yield stressor that can cause system failure.
Step 6.4: Check System Attenuation of Vulnerability
Check how subsystems attenuate vulnerabilities to stressors, perturbations and
interacting stressors; this is same with performing failure analysis using AFD-1,
so SIVAI-TRIZ and ARIZ are applicable in this step.
Step 6.5: Synthesize Failure of Vulnerability
Failures of vulnerability of system can be produced using resources, perturbations,
stressors, interacting stressors and systematically connect scenarios to scenario tree
of system. AFD-1 can be recursively applied to reveal scenarios that emanate from
vulnerability to resources, stressors and interacting perturbations.
STEP 7: USE AFD KNOWLEDGE BASE
Study AFD checklist to find some factors that may associate with the initiating
events, mid states and end states. These set of AFD checklist are attached to
appendix section. Any discovered scenario should be added to the scenario tree.
STEP 8: FIND POSSIBILITY OF GROWING THE TREE
Use ARIZ concept to find means of producing new end states or already identified
end states with available initiating events, mid states, and end states. As such,
ARIZ is used to recursively find new ways of producing already identified end
states or new end states. This is same with searching through scenario tree of
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system and trying to find different ways of producing new or already existing
end states using available system resources, initiating events, mid states and end
states.
STEP 9: INTENSIFY AND MASK HARMFUL EFFECT
In this step, intensify or worsen the harmful effect. The essence of worsening or
intensifying harmful effect is to identify scenarios that can occur when a system
failure mechanism extends over time. This step can reveal scenarios that are not
captured by the above steps.
STEP 10: ORGANIZE THE SCENARIO TREE
Scenario tree must be made neater, traceable and understandable; then, Corrective
or eliminative measure can be implemented.
Chapter 6
SIVAI-TRIZ Based AFD-3
So far, the two AFD methods have been modified to eliminate shortcomings that
are inherited when they are used to perform risk analysis. Modified AFD-1 has
capability that can be used to trace failure at lowest level of system architecture
and reveal its scenario. Modified AFD-2 has capability that can be utilized as
basis to reveal scenarios which take place before initiating events. Although these
two modified AFD methods are very sophisticated to perform failure analysis and
failure prediction, none has strong capability that can be used to capture and
reveal failure due to human error, bad ergonomics, or organizational error. Thus,
AFD-3 is systematically structured to capture and reveal scenario of failure due
to human error, organizational error, bad ergonomic design and other failures
(problems) that lies in manufacturing system.
Manufacturing system is complex system that has many subsystems, processes,
materials, organizations, and resources which are arrayed in layers and structure
that facilitate creation of product. It often becomes difficult task to identify root
causes of unintended behavior or product failure after manufacturing, assembling,
and dispatching product to market because of complexity of manufacturing system.
For example, Toyota called for return of some Toyota brands because of unintended
accelerations in 2009. Likewise, Boeing called for return of its 787 Dreamliner after
electrical faults forced unplanned landings last year. Boeing could not identify root
causes of the fault as urgent as masses expected despite that it caused wide spread
of fear and criticism.
Technical need to find root causes of unintended behavior of system after manu-
facturing, assembling, and dispatching comes up once or twice in a year. AFD-3
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method that is structured on fundamental principles of SIVAI-TRIZ is proposed
for solving such technical problem. This new AFD method can be used for pur-
pose of failure analysis – it is in same class with AFD-1, but both provide different
capabilities for solving different class of problem.
6.1 AFD-3 Template
AFD-3 embodies framework for managing system knowledge. Transformation
method provides good bases for analyzing a domain with information from another
domain. For example, transformation method is a means by which DM informa-
tion can be mapped to DSM which can provide bases for identifying source of
DP failure. This mapping method provides way to link system emergent behavior
to design parameters and process variables, which is crucial for identifying root
causes of design failure and revealing its scenario. The template is showed in the
following.
STEP 1: FORMULATE THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM
This step is same with step 1 in AFD-1: formulate original problem. This includes
naming the system, stating its purpose, and describing the failure or unintended
behavior that has appeared. It is crucial to find root causes of the unintended
behavior of the system.
STEP 2: IDENTIFY SUCCESS SCENARIO
This step is same with step 2 of modified AFD-1: state the subsystems (phases),
inputs, subsystem functions, and outputs. State and arrange inputs, subsystem
functions, and outputs in way that can show the system mechanism in a glance.
Reference can be made to chapter 4.
STEP 3: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE
STEP 3.1: Map System Dependency to DSM
Map subsystem dependencies to DSM matrix. Vector flow in the DSM matrix
should be represented in a way that information flows from column to row of DSM
matrix. Typical example on how to map system dependencies to DSM can be
revisited in chapter 4.
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Step 3.2: Identify the Failure
Analyze and pinpoint failure source using compact information captured by the
DSM matrix. This is same with identifying failure in a system or subsystem, which
is done by examining and drawing inferences about system interactions.
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STEP 4: FORMULATE THE PROBLEM AT SUBSYSTEM LEVEL
Formulate the problem captured in step 3, state subsystem purpose, describe the
failure that has occurred at the first level of form-form dependency, and condition
under which it occurred.
STEP 5: STATE SUCCESS SCENARIO AT THE SUBSYSTEM LEVEL
Define component functions, Inputs, and success results (outputs).
STEP 6: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE AT COMPONENT LEVEL
Map dependencies at component level to DSM and identify the source of failure
at this level. This is second level form-form dependency of system architecture.
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STEP 7: GATHER REQUIRED INFORMATION
Step 7.1: Consult Design Document
Gather information about component which the failure originated. Design sheet
that summarizes details about elemental parts of the component can be used in this
step. Important document to look for is document that has details about history
of design matrix (DM) because design matrix of axiomatic design has information
about translation of functional requirements (FRs) to design parameters (DPs).
As shown below, typical DM matrix carries information of relationship between
FRs and DPs.
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 X O X X
FR2 X X O X
FR3 X X X O
FR4 O X X X
Step 7.2: Map DM Information to DSM
Use transformation method to map DM information to DSM. Row matrix permu-
tation can be used. Design matrix of axiomatic design (DM) is transformed to
design structure method (DSM) as shown below. Mapping DM to DSM is done
in a way that output variables occupy diagonal of DSM matrix. Detailed example
is given in chapter 3 on how to map DM to DSM.
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DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
FR1 X O X X
FR2 X X O X
FR3 X X X O
FR4 O X X X
DMtoDSM−−−−−−→
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
DP1 X X X O
DP2 X X O X
DP3 X O X X
DP4 O X X X
STEP 8.0: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE AT DP LEVEL
In this step, identify design parameter from which the failure emanates; design
parameter (DP) from which the failure emanates can be identified by studying
interactions between design parameters (DPs) in DSM matrix. This is as depicted
below.
DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4
DP1 X X O
DP2 X O X
DP3 X O X
DP4 O X X
STEP 9: LOCALIZE THE DP FAILURE AT PROCESS DOMAIN
Design parameter (DP) from which the failure emanates is identified in step 8. Use
identified DP, design archive, and production archive to pinpoint manufacturing
process in which the DP is created or used to design a product. Root causes of the
DP problem are present in either process from which the DP is created or process
in which it is used to characterize a product. Figure 3.9 which illustrates system
knowledge management in chapter 3 can be revisited for clarity.
STEP 10: FORMULATE, INVERT, AND AMPLIFY THE PROBLEM
Formulate the DP problem at process domain, invert, and amplify the problem as
in typical AFD method. Important hint to keep in mind is that the DP attributes
carry description of the failure that can be synthesized. As such, the DP can be
formulated as shown in the following.
 It is crucial to synthesize DP attributes (problem) under condition of process
from which it is created using resources which are available in the manufac-
turing process
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DP problem can be amplified as thus:
 It is crucial to synthesize the problem on many DPs under condition of pro-
cess from which it is created using resources which are available in the man-
ufacturing proces
STEP 11: SEARCH FOR SOLUTION
Step 11.1: Search for Apparent Solution
Search for general solution to inverted and amplified problem in various branches
of engineering, sciences, research, and other endeavors. Identify the method of
the general solution that is used to create the phenomenon of the problem as in
typical AFD method. AFD has specialized software package that may help in this
case.
Step 11.2: Identify Resources in the Mnaufacturing Process
In this step, survey and list out resources that are used to intentionally create
phenomenon of the DP problem. Also, Use those surveyed resources which are
used to create the phenomenon to check for availability of their counterparts in the
manufacturing process. If those resources are present in manufacturing process,
the identified general solution is compatible solution to DP problem.
Step 11.3: Utilize the Identified Resources to Produce the DP Problem
Use identified resources and method to produce phenomenon of the failure. If
any resource which is used in the method to intentionally produce phenomenon
of the problem is missing in the identified resources that are available in manu-
facturing process, search for a way of producing the missing resources from those
that are apparently available. There may be biological effect, chemical effect or
physical effect that can be used to synthesize missing resources. If there is any
biological effect, chemical effect, or physical that can be used to synthesize missing
resource, check for presence of the effect in manufacturing process. The solution
is uncompromised if the effect is available in the process.
Solution is specialized solution to the DP problem if biological effect, chemical
effect, or physical effect that is used to produce missing resource is available in
manufacturing process; otherwise, proceed to next step.
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Step 11.4: ARIZ (Algorithm for Inventive Problem Solving)
Recap the problem, reformulate it, state ideal state, and find a means of reaching
ideal state using available resources and condition that accompanies or under which
the problem surfaced. ARIZ is explained in detail in chapter 3.
STEP 12: FORMULATE HYPOTHESIS AND VERIFY IT
In step 12, formulate hypothesis of specialized solution to the inverted problem
and verify its validity and trueness.
STEP 13: IMPLEMENT MEASURE FOR THE PROBLEM
Implement measure to correct, avert, or eliminate the problem.
Chapter 7
Practical Examples
In this chapter, practical applications of modified AFD-1, modified AFD-2 and
AFD-3 are demonstrated to show ‘step-by-step’ approach of using those three
methods to solve system problems. Although the examples that are used to prac-
tically illustrate applications of the methods are not empirical problems, the ex-
amples are compatible with sets of complex system failures that can be solved
using the methods. Such practical applications to those problem examples which
are compatible with empirical problems of system failures reveal future work that
can be done to enhance potency of AFD methods. The future work is stated and
explained in this chapter.
7.1 Radiation Pyrometer Failure Analysis
An industry that manufactures radiation pyrometer has been receiving customers’
complaints about inaccurate temperature measurements when its system is used
in field work. The customers complained that the problem normally occurs six
months after using it in field work. The industry had researched, surveyed, and
found out that fields in which the system normally develops the fault while in
use has cloud of dust particles which cannot impede its functionality. Sensor was
initially pinpointed as source of the problem, but technical examination, condition
monitoring, and data analysis show that it is functioning properly. Engineers
are finding a way to solve this problem to avoid losing its brand reputation and
customers, but they are unable to pinpoint root causes of the problem.
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7.1.1 Application of SIVAI-TRIZ Based AFD-1
Malfunctioning radiation pyrometer is typical example of failure analysis; suit-
able AFD method for this class of problem is AFD-1. Step-by-step approach of
performing system failure analysis with modified AFD-1 method is shown in the
following.
STEP 1: FORMULATE THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM
There is a system named radiation pyrometer, which is used to measure tempera-
ture of distant hot body. It is camera-like system which has eyepiece, rotating knob
for adjusting focus, and surfactant material that covers its lens. It often develops
problem of inaccurate measurement when it is used in cloud of dust particles in
field work in Sub-Sahara Africa.
STEP 2: STATE SUCCESS SCENARIOS
Success scenarios of the system are stated in below depicted table. The schematic
of the system is illustrated in figure 4.1 which can be revisited in chapter 4.
Subsystem Inputs Output
Optical System infrared energy energy
Sensor converged infrared signal
Temperature Indicator analog signal readings digital readings
Data Transmitter digital data data
Subsystem Sucess Scenario
Optical System sends converged Infrared energy
Sensor detects and sends infrared energy as analogue signal
Temperature Indicator Reads and Displays measurements
Data Transmitter Transmits data
STEP 3: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE
Step 3.1: Map Subsystem Interactions to DSM Matrix
Figure 4.1 which is block diagram of radiation pyrometer has subsystem interac-
tions that can be mapped to DSM as thus: converged radiation that flows from
optical system to sensor is represented with ‘X in [optical system, sensor] of DSM
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matrix; electrical signal that flows from sensor to temperature indicator is rep-
resented with ‘X’ in [sensor, temperature indicator]; digital data that flow from
temperature indicator to data transmitter is represented with ‘X’ in [temperature
indicator, data transmitter] of DSM matrix. Strength of flows in the system is
denoted with numerical values that can range between ‘0’ and ‘1’.
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Strength of flow between two subsystems can be represented in DSM matrix by
varying values between zero and one.
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Optical system 0 0 0 0
Sensor 1 0 0 0
Temperature Indicator 0 1 0 0
Data Transmitter 0 0 1 0
Calculate SMI of the DSM Matrix
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DSMP =

0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0

Using equation 4.1, the product of DSMP and DSM
T
P is equal to:
DSMS =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

(DSMS − λI) =

1− λ 0 0
0 1− λ 0
0 0 1− λ

λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 1, λ4 = 0 and α1 =
√
λ1 = α2 =
√
λ2 = α3 =
√
λ1 = 1;
α4 =
√
λ4 = 0
Figure 7.1: Graph of
∑N
i=1 | αiα1 − exp
1−i
Φ | against Φ
Chapter 7. Case Studies 68
The equation 3.1 is solved iteratively and
∑N
i=1 | αiα1 − exp
1−i
Φ | is plotted against Φ
as showed in the figure 7.1 above. SMI = Φ
∗
N
,where Φ∗ is value of Φ for which∑N
i=1 | αiα1 − exp
1−i
Φ | is minimum. Φ∗ is 4 according to figure 7.1 and N = 4.
SMI = 4
4
= 1. SMI = 1 implies that first level form-form dependency of the
system is modular and failure analysis can be based on phases of the first level
without losing information.
Step 3.2: Identify the Failure at Subsystem Level
DSM is used to pinpoint the source from which the failure emenates. The failure
emenates from optical system as shown below.
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STEP 4: FORMULATE THE PROBLEM AT SUBSYSTEM LEVEL
MKF optical system is a system that collects infrared energy from hot body and
converges it to sensors; it appears dusty and partially converges infrared energy
when it was used in cloud of dusty particle in field work in Sub-Sahara Africa.
STEP 5: IDENTIFY SUCCESS SCENARIOS
Components Inputs Output
Front Lens infrared energy converged infrared energy
Mirror converged infrared energy reflected infrared energy
Middle Lens converged rays diverged rays
Back Lens diverged rays converged rays
sensor converged infrared energy electrical signal
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Component Function
Front Lens Converges infrared energy to mirror
Mirror reflects converged infrared energy to sensor
Middle Lens diverges rays to back lens
Back Lens converges rays to eye piece
Sensor convert infrared to electrical signal
STEP 6: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE AT COMPONENT LEVEL
Step 6.1: Map Component Interaction to DSM Matrix
The failure emanates from optical system which is one of those subsystems in radi-
ation pyrometer. Analysis can be focused on optical system to localize the failure
at second level of form-form dependency. Component interactions are mapped
to DSM matrix as shown in the following. Figure 4.2 which is block diagram of
optical system can be revisited in chapter 4.
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Calculate SMI of the DSM matrix
(DSMS − λI) =

1− λ 0 0 0
0 1− λ 0 0
0 0 1− λ 0
0 1 0 −λ

Row and column operations are performed on the DSM matrix to obtain:
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(DSMS − λI) =

1− λ 0 0 0
0 1− λ 0 0
0 0 1− λ 0
0 0 0 −λ

λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 1, λ4 = 0 and α1 = α2 = α3 = 1, α4 = 0
Figure 7.2: Second Graph of
∑N
i=1 | αiα1 − exp
1−i
Φ | against Φ
SMI = Φ
∗
N
= 3
4
= 0.75; SMI is less than unity value which indicates that the
subsystem is modularized as well as integrated. Optical system is modular-integral
system. Analysis must be focused on all interactions to avoid loss of information.
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Step 6.2 : Identify the Failure at Component Level
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STEP 7: FORMULATE THE PROBLEM AT COMPONENT LEVEL
MKF lens is a component in optical system called front lens which is covered with
amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon material. It converges infrared energy to a
mirror in optical system, but it developed failure of unevenly converging infrared
energy to a mirror when it is used in cloud of dust particles in field work in Sub-
Sahara Africa.
STEP 8: INVERT AND AMPLIFY THE FAILURE
It is crucial to produce lens failure of unevenly converging infrared energy to mirror
using available resources and condition in which the system is used.
It is important that the failure of unevenly converging energy to mirror using
available resources and condition in which the system is used.
STEP 9: SEARCH FOR SOLUTION
First step, search for general method of producing uneven convergence of infrared
energy in lens. Example, I found in the internet that uneven convergence of
infrared energy in lens is produced by deposition of dust particles and oil on lens.
Now, the method of producing phenomenon of uneven convergence of infrared
energy is found. Proceed to next step.
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Step 9.1: Survey Resources
Step 9.1.1: Survey Resource in the Identified Method
Resources used in the method: dust particles, oil, infrared energy, lens, and depo-
sition.
Step 9.1.2: Survey Resources in the Formulated Problem
Available Resources in the problem are dust particles, wind, infrared energy,
amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon material, material permeability, material abra-
siveness, and lens. Since the resources used in identified method are present in
the formulated problem, solution for this problem is counterpart of the identifed
method and the method can be used to produce phenomenon of the system failure.
Step 9.2: Use the Resources to Produce the Failure
Deposition of dust particles on the “amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon” mate-
rial can be produced by wind, dust, and abrasiveness of the material: wind blows
dust particles to deposit itself on amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon material
because of its abrasiveness. Now, how dust particles are deposited on amine-
carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon material which covers front lens is revealed, but
solution is to reveal how it is deposited on the lens. How can this be achieved with
available resources in the formulated problem? Amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon
covers the lens, but it is permeable; amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon material
permeability is one of the resources of the formulated problem; thus, permeability
can instigate diffusion process. Taking into consideration material permeability,
deposition of dust particles on front lens can be synthesized by wind, dust particles,
abrasiveness, and material permeability: wind blows dust particles to deposit itself
on amine-carboxylated-perfluorocarbon material which its permeability instigates
diffusion process that deposits dust particles on front lens.
Uneven convergence of infrared energy in lens can be produced through deposition
of dust particles and oil on lens according to details in identified method; how
dust particles are deposited on front lens are revealed, but how oil is deposited on
front lens is not revealed. How can oil be deposited on the lens along with dust?
The acceptable means to produce oil is through use of available resources in the
formulated problem, but there is no known physical, chemical or biological effect
by which oil can be produced using the available resources. As such, ARIZ can be
applied.
Chapter 7. Case Studies 73
STEP 9.3: Apply ARIZ (Algorithm for Inventive Problem Solving
Step 9.3.1: Formulate Secondary Problem
Uneven convergence of infrared through lens is realized by deposition of oil and
dust particles and passing infrared energy through dust-oil contaminated lens.
Deposition of dust particles is realized, but deposition of oil is not.
Step 9.3.2: State Ideal Solution
Produce oil using available resources in the formulated problem and deposit it on
the lens by physical, chemical or biological process that is either present in the
field where the system is used or generated as result of the available resources.
Step 9.3.3: Search for Solution
There are different methods of producing oil, but the method that is compatible
with the secondary formulated problem is amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon oil
production method. By this method, oil droplets are produced by exposing car-
bonxylated –perfluorocarbon, amine, water to temperature change.
Step 9.3.3.1: Survey Resources
Resources used in the method: amine, carbonoxylated-perfluorocarbon, water,
and temperature change.
Resources available in the problem: amine, amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon,
and temperature change.
Step 9.3.3.2: Produce the Phenomenon
One missing resources in the formulated problem is water, but water can be gen-
erated through evaporation and condensation by temperature change effect; water
is produced through evaporation and condensation driven by temperature change:
temperature increases in the day to instigate evaporation, but it drops in the
night to instigate condensation process that produces water and wet front lens.
Also, Produced water droplets, amine, and amine-carboxylated-Perfluorocarbon
exposed to temperature increase during the day produces oil and deposits its
droplets on the lens.
The deposited oil droplets, dust particle and infrared energy cause uneven conver-
gence of energy from the front lens.
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STEP 10: FORMULATE HYPOTESIS AND VERIFY IT
The solution can be hypothesized as thus: radiation Pyrometer used to measure
temperature of hot body in cloud of dust particle in Sub-Sahara Africa unevenly
converges infrared energy because of deposition of oil droplets and dust particles
on front lens which diverges infrared energy from reflector (mirror).
STEP 11: CORRECT THE FAILURE
Implement measure to avert the problem.
7.2 Prediction of Future Failures of Boiler
An industry recently designed and manufactured a new system called biomass
boiler. Users of this system are people of age that range from nine years old to up-
wards. The industry wants to predict failures of the system in order to implement
measures to avert any possible failure to satisfy minimum safety requirement that
is imposed by society.
Figure 7.3: Schematic of Biomass Bioler [8]
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7.2.1 Application of SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-2
SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-2 is principally used to perform failure prediction. It is
applicable to the problem of predicting failure of biomass boiler.
STEP 1: FORMULATE THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM
There is a system called biomass boiler which is primarily designed to heat water
for domestic use. The essence of this analysis is to predict future failures that can
occur as result of using the system in order to eliminate them from the system.
STEP 2: STATE SUCCESS SCENARIOS
Subsystem Success Scenario
Reservoir Stores and pressures out water to valve
Protective Valve Closes or opens flow path to circulator
Circulator Moves the water to boiler
Boiler Heats up water from circulator
Expansion Tank Pressures water to valve
Valve Closes or open flow path to reservoir
STEP 3: GATHER SYSTEM INFORMATION
Step 3.1: Map System Interaction to DSM
Interactions in biomass bioler depicted in figure 7.3 are mapped to DSM matrix
as depicted in the following
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In the DSM matrix, information flows from columns to rows. Information flow in
the DSM matrix is: reservoir→ protective valve→ wood circulator→ wood boiler
→ expansion tanks → Zone valve → Reservoir. In SIVAI-TRIZ AFD-2 method,
DSM information flow determines mid states (MSs) and harmful end states (HESs)
of a system. For example, initiating events at reservoir has negative impact on
protective valve and other subsystems of the biomass boiler. These negative im-
pacts can be labelled mid states (MSs) and harmful end states depending on their
positions in DSM information flow – negative impacts at reservoir can be labelled
HES and negative impact of initiating events at other subsystems can be labelled
MSs in this example. For instance:
IEr1 : Low water flow from reservoir due to bad diaphragm
MSb1 :Very hot wood boiler due to low water flow
MSe1: Too much steam in expansion tank
MSz1: Too much heat stress on zone valve
HESr1:Very hot water in reservoir
IEr1 →MSb1 →MSe1 →MSz1 → HESr1
IEr2 : Too much water flow from reservoir
MSv1 :More pressure stress on protective valve
MSe2: Steam reduction in expansion tank
MSz2: Too much pressure stress on zone valve
HESr2:Drop in temperature of water in reservoir
IEr2 →MSv1 →MSe2 →MSz2 → HESr2
IEp1 : Protective valve not opening well
MSw1 :Formation of debris due to frictional impact at joint of wood circulator
MSb1: Very hot wood boiler
MSe1: Too much steam in expansion tank
MSz1: Too much heat stress at zone valve
HESr1:Very hot water in reservoir
IEp1 →MSw1 →MSb1 →MSe1 →MSz1 → HESr1
IEv2 : Blockage of flow through protective valve
MSw1: Formation of debris due to frictional impact at joint of wood circulator
MSb2: Very red hot wood boiler
MSb3: Melting of filaments of boiler
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MSe2: Pressure drops in expansion tank
HESr3: Reduction in volume of warm water in reservoir
IEv2 →MSw1 →MSb2 →MSb3 →MSe2 → HESr3
IEw2 : slowly spinning of circulator
MSf1: Very low water flow through boiler
MSb1: very hot wood boiler
MSe1: too much steam in expansion tank
MSz1: More heat stress at zone valve
HESr1: Very hot water in reservoir
IEw2 →MSf1 →MSb1 →MSe1 →MSz1 → HESr1
IEe1 : Low expansion due to damage of diaphragm of expansion tank
HESr3: Reduction in volume of warm water in reservoir
IEe1 → HESr3
Initiating events (IEs), mid states (MSs), and harmful end states (HESs) at the
first level of form-form dependencies (subsystems) of biomass boiler are revealed as
showed above, but root causes of those initiating events which appears at subsys-
tems are not yet revealed. Root causes of those initiating events can be revealed
by applying AFD-2 method to each subsystem as it is applied in biomass bioler
that constitutes them (subsystems).
STEP 4: INVERT AND AMPLIFY THE PROBLEMS
Apply AFD-1 method to each initiating events, mid states, and harmful end states
that are revealed in step 3.
STEP 5: SURVEY RESOURCES
New mid states or initiating events can be identified through surveying and ana-
lyzing interactions among resources used and generated in a system; for example,
resources that are used and generated in the biomass boiler are cold water, hot
water, pressure, fuel, wood, steam, temperature et cetera. IEs and MSs that can
appear because of using the resource ‘wood’ in the system are:
IEw2 : Wood debris formation
MSv3 : Blockage of circulator by the wood debris
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MSf2 : Low flow through boiler
MSb1 : Very hot boiler
MSe1 : Too much steam in expansion tank
MSz2 : More heat stress on zone valve
HESr1: Very hot water in reservoir
IEw2 →MSv3 →MSf2 →MSb1 →MSe1 →MSz2 → HESr1
STEP 6: VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
Failures due to vulnerability of the biomass boiler can be identified in this step.
Vulnerabilities can be assessed based on responsiveness of biomass boiler to re-
sources that are situated within or around the system. It can also be a function of
time because it may take long time in some system for vulnerability to be noticed.
Example:
IEc1: Enfeebling circulator coil due to vulnerability to flow force and pressure
IEf1: Loss of Filament mass due to vulnerability to heat and flow force
IEd1: Damage diaphragm contraction and expansion due to vulnerability to steam
and heat flux
IEc1 →MSf2 →MSb1 →MSe2 →MSz2 → HESr2
IEf1 →MSh1 →MSe2 → HESr2
IEd1 →MSf2 → HESr3
STEP 7: USE AFD KNOWLEDGE BASE
In this step, AFD has knowledge base of system failures. The AFD database can
be searched to identify other failure that are applicable to the systems.
STEP 8: FIND THE POSSIBILITY OF GRROWING THE TREE
Search through failure tree of biomass bioler for possibility of producing other
IEs, MSs or HESs using already identified IEs, MSs, and HESs in a scenario tree.
ARIZ and SIVAI-TRIZ are very useful for this particular purpose. Scenario tree
of biomass boiler is as shown below.
IEr1 →MSb1 →MSe1 →MSz1 → HESr1
IEp1 →MSw1 →MSb1 →MSe1 →MSz1 → HESr1
IEr2 →MSv1 →MSe2 →MSz2 → HESr2
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IEv2 →MSw1 →MSb2 →MSb3 →MSe2 → HESr3
IEw2 →MSf1 →MSb1 →MSe1 →MSz1 → HESr1
IEe1 → HESr3
IEw2 →MSv3 →MSf2 →MSb1 →MSe1 →MSz2 → HESr1
IEc1 →MSf2 →MSb1 →MSe2 →MSz2 → HESr2
IEf1 →MSh1 →MSe2 → HESr2
IEd1 →MSf2 → HESr3
STEP 9: INTENSIFY AND MASK HARMFUL EFFECT
This is technical. Importance of this step is to find failures that appear as function
of time or worsen as system functions in time.
STEP 10: ORGANIZE THE SCENARIO TREE
Find root causes of each IE, MS and HES. Organize the scenario tree.
7.3 Failure in Complex Manufacturing System
Technicians that are responsible for servicing aircraft engine complained of fre-
quent formation of crystals in aircraft engines which were recently dispatched to
their company. They would have thought that the problem was due to impurity
of jet fuel, but all customers who purchased the same aircraft observed the same
problem and made complaints to industry that manufactured it. In order to allay
wide spread of fear, the industry is facing big challenge in finding root cause of
the problem.
7.3.1 Application of SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-3
STEP 1: FORMULATE THE PROBLEM
787 gas engines is a system that powers Boeing 787 Dreamliner; it is compact
structure that comprises fuel tank, fuel pumps, filter and injector. It was manu-
factured on 14th February and dispatched to customers on 30th April, 2012, but
those customers called and made complaints of white formation of crystal in the
engine system.
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Figure 7.4: Schematic of Aircraft Fuel System [9]
STEP 2: IDENTIFY SUCCESS SCENARIOS
Subsystem Sucess Scenario
Fuel Tank Stores fuel
Feed Pump Transfers fuel to filter
Fule Filter Isolates impurities and transfers fuel to fuel pump
Fuel Pump Transfers fuel to injection nozzle
Injector Mixes fuel with air and feeds engine
Engine Block Powers aircraft body
STEP 3: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE
STEP 3.1: Map System Dependency to DSM
This step is same as in AFD-1; map interactions at subsystem level to DSM matrix
and localize failure. The failure can be localized in DSM by analyzing interactions
with respect to function of subsystem and its output (success scenario). For ex-
ample, there is formation of white crystal in the engine system indicates that the
problem may emenate from fuel filter.
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Step 3.2: Identify the Failure
As shown in DSM matrix, the failure is localized at filter in subsystem level of the
engine fuel system. Further, fuel filter can be decomposed to localize the failure
at component level. A number of DSM mapping required to localize failure at
component level depends on system architecture.
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Feed Pump X O O O O
Fuel Filter O X O O O
Fuel Pump O O X O O
Injector O O O X O
Engine Block O O O O X
STEP 4: FORMULATE THE PROBLEM AT SUBSYSTEM LEVEL
Fuel filter is a subsystem in aircraft engine, which separates contaminants and
impurities from fuel that flows to engine block. The fuel allows white crystals
which accumulate in the engine system. Visual analysis and technical examination
indicate that this failure appears under intended conditions for which the filter is
designed.
STEP 5: STATE SUCCESS SCENARIOS AT SUBSYSTEM LEVEL
Figure 7.5: Examplary Block Diagram of Fuel Filter
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Subsystem Sucess Scenario
Electromeric Seal Provides positive sealing
Hydroshield Repels water and other contaminants
Duty Housing Provides unequal burst and pulse
Centertube Prevent system collapse
Drain Valve Provides compatibility
STEP 6: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE AT COMPONENT LEVEL
Interactions in figure 7.5 are mapped to DSM and the failure is localized as shown
in the below depicted DSM. The failure is localized at the basic element of aircraft
engine fuel system; thus, the next approach is consulting design archives (records).
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Duty Housing O X O O
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STEP7:GATHER REQUIRED INFORMATION
Step 7.1: Consult Design Document
The proper document to look for in this step is design matrix (DM) of axiomatic
design. Let us suppose that the design structure matrix of the basic element
’hydroshield’ is 3-by-3 order matrix shown below.
DP1 DP2 DP3
FR1 O X X
FR2 X O X
FR3 X X O
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Step 7.2: Map DM Information to DSM
Perform matrix permutation on the DM matrix or use relationship among out-
put varaiables and dependent variables to map DM to DSM matrix. Method of
mapping DM to DSM matrix is explained in chapter 3.
First approach: choose output variables in the DM matrix such that each output
variable occupies only a row and column of DM matrix.
DP1 DP2 DP3
FR1 O X X
FR2 X O X
FR3 X X O
Second approach: Find a unique permutation matrix such that performing row
permutation on the DM matrix with the permutation matrix moves chosen output
variables to the diagonal of the matrix; the permutation matrix for the 3-by-3 order
DM matrix:
Permutationmatrix =

0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

DP1 DP2 DP3
DP1 O X X
DP2 X O X
DP3 X X O
Third step: perform matrix row permutation to obtain the information flows in
the right order (in DSM matrix) by multiplying columns of DM matrix with rows
of permutation matrix using equation 3.11. The matrix shown below is obtained
DSM matrix of the design parameters.The transformation method was started
with design matrix (DM) of axiomatic design and ended with design structure
matrix (DSM) of design parameter (DPs) shown below.
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DP1 DP2 DP3
DP1 X O X
DP2 X X O
DP3 O X X
STEP 8.0: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE AT DP LEVEL
DSM matrix of design parameters is obtained in step 7 using transformation
method. Use the DSM matrix of DPs to localize failure at DP level through
analyzing interactions among DPs. The source of problem is DP2 as indicated
below in DSM with red color.
DP1 DP2 DP3
DP1 O X
DP2 X O
DP3 O X
STEP 9.0: LOCALIZE THE FAILURE PROCESS LEVEL
The DP2 can be used in this step to trace manufacturing process of manufacturing
system that generated it. Design archives can be consulted to find out manufac-
turing process from which the DP is generated. Root causes of the DP problem
lie in the process.
STEP 10: FORMULATE, INVERT, AND AMPLIFY THE PROBLEM
This step is same as in AFD-1. How to invert and amplify a failure or problem is
well explained in first example.
STEP 11: SEARCH FOR SOLUTION
This is same as in AFD-1. An important information to keep in mind is that
resources for synthesizing a problem can include tools, technical decison, organi-
zational decision, processes, raw materials, et cetera which are used to generate a
DP in manufacturing process.
STEP 12: FORMULATE HYPOTHESIS AND VERIFY IT
The same as in AFD-1 example.
STEP 13: IMPLEMENT MEASURE FOR THE PROBLEM
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The same as in AFD-1 example.
7.4 Summary and Conclusion
In chapter 1, thesis background, purpose, and problem statement are presented
and explained which set the direction of this thesis research. The background
shows importance of employing system engineering concepts to improve capability
of AFD methods.
Concepts of AFD templates that are developed by Stan Kaplan et al are presented
in the chapter 2. The shortcomings of the AFD methods and solution by which
they can be averted are explained and presented in chapter 3.
In chapter 4, SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-1 is developed which takes system inter-
actions and system emergent behaviors into consideration. SIVAI-TRIZ based
AFD-1 has capability which can be used to improve system safety and reliability
because system engineering tool such as design structure matrix is embedded in the
method. Also, this modified AFD-1 is technically suitable to develop database of
past failures and aid future system design because it embodies system engineering
concepts which makes it good candidate for system modeling.
SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-2 is developed in chapter 5. This newly modified AFD-2
has capability which can be used to predict system future failures based on vector
flows, architecture, and system emergent behaviors. It is technically suitable for
conceptualization and design because its template embodies system interaction,
vulnerability analysis, and differential vulnerability.
In chapter 6, AFD-3 is created to capture failure due to human error and poor
ergonomic design. Particularly, this tool is specially developed to reveal root
causes of product failure in a manufacturing system from which it is generated. It
draws relationship between details of design concept and system emergent proper-
ties through mapping DM information to DSM information using transformation
method.
In chapter 7, practical examples are used to illustrate SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-1
method; SIVAI-TRIZ based AFD-2 method, and AFD-3. The problems that are
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used to exemplify SIVAI-TRIZ AFD concepts are not real-life problem, but they
are intuitively fabricated to match real-life problem.
7.5 Future Work
Recommended work includes applying the methods to real-life problems and cre-
ating software that can aid in using these methods to solve engineering problem.
Application of SIVAI-TRIZ AFD methods to real-life engineering problem will re-
veal difficulty that may be faced in using them to solve industry problems. Their
applications to many industry problems are crucial to ascertain their technical
strengths and weakness based on practicalities. Software system that is based on
I-TRIZ body of knowledge should be updated to accomodates SIVAI-TRIZ body
of knowledge.
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Fundamentals of the two modified AFD methods and AFD-3 are TRIZ (theory
of inventive problem solving), design structure matrix (DSM), and transformation
method. In this appendix A, TRIZ principles, DSM matrix, and transformation
method are thoroughly explained in simplest way that facilitates understanding of
those two modified AFD methods and AFD-3 method. It is important to grasp the
fundamentals that are explained in this appendix A to know how to use modified
AFD-1 template, modified AFD-2 template, and AFD-3 template to solve system
problem.
A.1 Theory of Inventive Problem Solving (TRIZ)
The early father of TRIZ is Genrich Altshuller, who was a Russian citizen. At
the end of Second World War, Genrich Altshuller started working as patent ap-
proving agent in the department of navy in old Soviet Union. While working as
patent examiner, he made three discoveries on which invention and development
of TRIZ over fifty years depend. Genrich Altshuller catalogued patents submitted
for examination, analyzed them, and discovered that there are similar patterns of
solutions to similar problems for first discovery. As result of this, he postulated
there is possibility of creating mechanism that defines a problem type and map-
ping the problem type to its solution type in solution space. In furtherance, he
also analyzed evolution of chronologically evolving technology and discovered reg-
ularities. He referred to “such time-based” evolution of technology as eight laws
of engineered system. This discovery is applied in different disciplines that range
87
Appendix A 88
from product development to innovation. Applicability of this discovery is due to
revelation that chronologically evolving technology is derivative. Derivative in the
sense that a point in the chronological order of evolving technology determines
what can be done to create next new product or innovation. Genrich Altshuller’s
first discovery and derivative nature of chronologically evolving technology makes
innovation and development of I-TRIZ tools possible.
A.1.1 Principles of TRIZ
The basic components of TRIZ principle are ideality principle, principle of con-
tradictions, and principle of maximal use of resources. These three principles are
basic elements that determine analytical approach of AFD. They are detailed to
an extent in the following to give glimpses of their concepts which are important
to understand the main part of this thesis work.
A.1.2 Ideality Principle
Ideality principle is at the first level of TRIZ mechanized structure for solving
specific inventive problem as it serves as a pointer that points to desired state of
a system with which can be used to reveal resources and conditions for reaching
a state. Notion of ideality principle is even embedded in man’s daily routines
and can be equated with common belief that if one knows where one is going
one will definitely know what can be used and how to get there; for instance, if
one’s ideal place for tourism is United States, one need different resources from
someone whose ideal place of tourism is Canada. In context of the example, it is
philosophically accurate to think about such journey as a system because it does
not only depend on time, but it normally has one or more transits which can be
seen as phases. Ideality principle narrows focus on resources that are required to
reach a phase such as time, distance, space in the flight, petrol gas, automobile and
aircraft as in case of example “if one knows where one is going, one will definitely
know what can be used and how to get there.”
Ideality principle postulates that ideal state increases as a system functions over
a time interval. Ideality is ratio of useful functions to harmful function [10].
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I = f(t, FU , FH) (A.1)
Useful function, FU , is set of desired functions of a system. According to ideality
principles, desired function converges to extreme state of ideality as a system trans-
verses its phases over time. Harmful function, FH , comprises a set of undesired
attributes, properties, costs et cetera. FH is a function of time as its counterpart.
Ideality can be mathematically expressed as ratio of useful function of time to
harmful function of time.
I =
FU
FH
(A.2)
As denoted in the equation, ideality goes to extreme limit when harmful function
is reduced, which is main goal of risk science. Ideality principle is used in AFD
approach to narrow area of analysis in order to identify system resources to reveal
a failure scenario.
A.1.3 Principle of Maximal Use of Resources
Another basic principle of TRIZ is maximal use of resource. Principle of maximal
use of resource is related to ideality principle because an ideal state determines
resources that are required to reach a state. Principle of maximal use of resources
and ideality principle exhibit same truism though they tackle AFD problem from
opposite directions. Principle of maximal use of resources tackles AFD problem
from left to right, but ideality principle tackles problem from right to left. Both
principles are pivotal for analytical approach of revealing failure scenario using
AFD method.
Principle of maximal use of resources states that an ideal state can only be reached
if and only if required resources to reach a state are present. For example, one
cannot reach one’s ideal place of tourism without aircraft, automobile, petrol as
in the example “if one knows where one is going, one will definitely know what
can be used and how to get there.”
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A.1.4 Principle of Contradiction
Principle of contradictions is way of finding uncompromised solution to inven-
tive problem. In solving inventive problem, principal aim is to identify technical
contradiction and physical contradiction and find a solution that resolves both con-
tradictions. Solution that resolves both contradictions is uncompromised solution
to a specific inventive problem.
Technical contradiction refers to situation in which two parameters are conflicting;
for example, problem of mass verses strength in bridge construction. The desire
attributes is to have as lower mass of material as possible, but higher strength
of material, which are conflicting since increasing mass is enhancing strength of
material.
Physical contradiction refers to a situation in which a parameter satisfies oppo-
siteness of two conflicting parameters. Finding a parameter that satisfies physical
contradiction is finding solution to technical contradiction.
Principle of contradiction states that uncompromised solution to specific inventive
problem can be devised by solving inherent technical contradictions and physical
contradictions of a system.
A.2 AFD Thought-Process Cycle
Anticipatory failure determination is RA approach that is oriented in the direction
of failure inventiveness. The philosophy of orienting AFD to this direction is due
to shift in paradigm of risk science. The paradigm maintains and stresses that
failure scenario can be accurately revealed if it is produced rather than stated
using physical attributes of a failure. The paradigm is reflected in AFD by basing
thought process on theory of inventive problem solving (1-TRIZ), which makes
AFD better tool for risk analysis and risk prediction. Strength of I-TRIZ lies in
ideality concept, technical contradiction, physical contradiction, and maximal use
of resources.
AFD thought-process cycle is based on solution by abstraction, which involves se-
ries of mapping from one abstraction to another. This cycle encompasses mapping
reformulated problem to its problem abstract category, mapping problem abstract
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category to its solution abstract category, and using solution abstract category
to specialize the solution. The thought-process cycle continues until specialized
solution is found. The diagram below depict the thought process cycle at glance
[10].
Figure A.1: Generic Solution by Abstraction [10]
The first step of AFD thought-process cycle is finding specific problem and making
it inventive; for example the specific problem can be failure of a system or encoun-
tered problem in one or more phases of an activity. The specific problem must be
made inventive by inverting it in such way that it can be synthesized rather than
observed and stated; for instance, if failures of a system have been identified as
camshaft crack and noisy break system, the failure can be made inventive problem
as thus:
It is important to produce failure of camshaft using available resources and condi-
tion that accompanies the failure.
It is important to produce failure of noisy break system using available resources
and condition that accompanies the failure.
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Stating the problem of the failure as showed above shifts attention from stating
root causes of failure using physical attribute to creating a failure and revealing
its scenario using physical attribute of the problem and resources.
The second step of the thought-cycle process is mapping the specific inventive
problem to its problem abstract category. Scientifically and analytically, it is
believed that every problem belongs to a problem abstract category. In math-
ematical language, problem abstract category is superset of analogous problems
which are characterized by attributes of a problem abstract category in problem
space. The essence of this mapping to problem abstract category is to identify and
provide analogous attributes with which solution abstract category of specific in-
ventive problem can be identified; then available information and resources which
are required can be easily flushed out.
Third step of the thought process is mapping the already identified problem ab-
stract category to it solution abstract category in problem space. Philosophical
thinking in step two is analogous with that of step three because it is believed
that every problem abstract category has its distinct solution abstract category
in solution space either. Main reason for identify solution abstract category in
solution space is to identify analogous attributes of solution abstract category to
which the problem abstract category belongs, which will reveal what are required
to solve an inventive problem.
In the fourth step, analogous attributes of solution abstract category is used to
specialize specific solutions to specific inventive problem solving. Attributes of
specific inventive problem is compared against analogous attributes of solution
abstract category to specialize solutions to its inventive problem. Typical exam-
ple of this thought process is method of solving differential equations in various
engineering disciplines. This is illustrated in figure A.2.
In figure A.2, AFD thought-process cycle can be likened to method of solving
differential equations. In solving differential equations, most crucial pieces of in-
formation are equation itself, boundary conditions, and independent variables.
The same can be thought about AFD approach because it is isoperimetric with
differential equations. These two methods are isoperimetric because there is al-
ways condition that accompanies a system failure which defines failure boundary
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Figure A.2: Solution by Abstraction Using Differential Equation
and its resources. Resources can be likened to independent variables of differ-
ential equations in this context in order to understand similarities between both
methods.
As in first step of solving differential equation, equation is formulated and bound-
ary conditions and limits of independent variables are stated. This is likened to
AFD approach because failure is formulated and resources within the vicinity at
which the failure occurred are surveyed. Formulation of the problem and survey
of resources defines attributes of failure.
As illustrated in the step two of figure A.2, the equation, ut–uxx = t sin 2x, is
mapped to its abstract problem category, aut–buxx = c. This step is accomplished
in AFD method by inverting a problem so that risk analysis is focused on how to
produce the failure rather than state solution using physical attributes.
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In step three, problem abstract category, ut–uxx = c, is mapped to its solution
abstract category U = e−ct sin ct. In AFD method, this step is accomplished
by identifying a branch of studies, engineering, sciences, et cetera in which a
phenomenon of failure is intentionally synthesized. Identifying where such phe-
nomenon is produced narrows area of analysis and shows how such failure can be
produced.
In the fourth step of figure A.2, coefficients of the equation of the solution abstract
category, U = ce−ct sin ct are determined by using boundary conditions and inde-
pendent variables of the equation and comparing with attributes of its abstract
solution category for solution specialization. Process of finding numerical values of
coefficients of differential equation is known as specialization of solution abstract
category to inventive problem. In AFD method, this step is accomplished by us-
ing resources and parameters of conditions which accompanies failure to resolve
its contradictions.
In this appendix, origin of TRIZ, TRIZ principles, basic elements of TRIZ and
AFD-thought process cycle are already explained to an extent which is sufficient
to grasp new approaches are presented in the thesis. The glimpse of AFD method
introduced in here is provided to show that modified AFD-1, modified AFD-2 and
new created AFD-3 retain philosophy on which AFD method is built, but provide
better framework for analyzing, predicting and revealing failure scenarios.
A.3 Design Structure Matrix(DSM)
DSM is N2-matrix tool that is used in system engineering to capture system
interactions. In recent years, DSM is increasingly used in system engineering
because system behaviors are largely determined by interactions of its constituents.
In DSM matrix, number of rows and columns are equal which are required to ensure
that DSM captures totality of system behaviors and interactions. Information
flows can be represented in DSM matrix in such a way that they either flow
from a column across rows of the matrix or flow from a row across columns of the
matrix. Those two ways of representing information flow provide same results. For
example, information flow in a system can be mapped to DSM as thus: information
flow from component A to component B can be represented in A column and C row
of DSM matrix; information flow from B to C can be represented in B column and
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C row; information flow from C to D can be represented in C column and D row.
This way of representing system interactions in DSM matrix can be called column-
to-row information flow since information flows from a column through rows of the
matrix. Knowing how information flows in DSM matrix that represents system
behavior is good technical approach to localize a system failure and predict system
future failures. The Information flows in system block diagram shown in figure
A.3 is represented in the follwing DSM matrix.
Figure A.3: System Block Diagram
A B C D
A O O O
B O O O
C X X O
D O O X
The matrix can be changed to numerical DSM by replacing ’X’ with numerical
value ’1’ and ’O’ with 0 as shown below for figure A.3.
A B C D
A 0 0 0
B 0 0 0
C 1 1 0
D 0 0 1
In a system, there are different kinds of flow due to technical needs and inputs
which are taken into consideration during design; for example, energy transfer from
component A to component B is required in power system design; temperature
flow from component A to component B is required in gas turbine system design.
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Knowing component functions and flows between two components is essential to
use DSM to localize system failure. The different kinds of flow due to technical
needs and inputs in a system are summarized in the following table.
Interaction Description Flow
Spatial Adjacency or orientation between A and B
Energy Energy transfer from A to B A→ B
Information Informaion flow from A to B A→ B
Material Material transfer from A to B A→ B
Mechanical steady state A and B are in physical contact and imposed
steady steady A↔ B
Mechanical dynamics A and B are in contact and interact by force A↔ B
Thermal dynamics Fluctuating difference between A and B A→ B
Thermal steady State There is steady state difference in temperature
between A and B A→ B
Electrical Signal Signal flow from A to B A→ B
Electrical earth Electrical earth connection between A to B A↔ B
Electrical dynamics Logical behavior of A is connected to that of B A→ B
A.4 How to Use DSM to Predict Failures
Flow of resources and relationships between two components in DSM matrix are
two most important details of the matrix, which are essential to either localize
failure or predict future failures of a system. Because of importance of flow in
use of DSM, some kinds of flow which often occur in a system are summarized
in the table above though there are others that can come up when risk analy-
sis or risk prediction of complex system is performed. DSM matrix traps flows
and component relationships which define system behaviors when flows are appro-
praitely represented in the matrix. As such, defining relationships between two
components and stating flows of resources while performing risk analysis or risk
prediction are very important to localize failure or predict future initiating events
(IEs), middle states (MDs), and end states (ESs) using the matrix. The following
digraph in figure A.4 and its DSM matrix can be used to demostrate how to use
DSM to predict failures.
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Figure A.4: Simple Block Diagram
B C D
B 0 0
C 1 0
D 0 1
Step 1: Identify Flow Paths in DSM
In DSM matrix of a system, one or more flow paths can be present; identify the
flow paths, define flow of resources, and archive them. For example flow path of
DSM matrix for the figure A.4 is: B → C → D. It is important to note that
information flows from column accross rows in the DSM matrix.
Step 2: Identify and Archive Failures of Components on the Flow Paths
In this step, start with least dependent component and find all possible failures
that can appear in the component; for example, find possible failures that can
appear in component B, component C, and component D. The possible failures
that can occur in component A, component B, and component C can be regarded
as initiating events (IEs) of the system. In DSM of figure A.4, degree of depen-
dency can be summarized as thus: B has least dependency, component C has less
dependency, and component D has little dependency in the flow path.
Step 3: Identify Effects of IEs and MSs on Subsequent Component
Analyze, identify, and state effects of failures that can appear in each component
on subsequent component. Identifying effect of failures on subsequent component
must be started with least dependent component in a flow path. For example,
effects of failures (in B component) on C component are possible mid states (MDs)
at that level of the flow path. Further Analyze and state effects of those mid states
(at C component level ) on the component D. The effects of middle states ( at C
component) on the component D can be archived as the possible end states (ESs)
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of the flow path (B → C → D) since component D is last component of the flow
path.
Further, analyze and state effect of failures that can appear in C component on
the D component. Also, those effects of failures (IEs of component C) on D
can be archived as end states (ESs). Method of using DSM to predict future
failures is iterative and it must be performed with respect to degree of component
dependency in a flow path.
Summarily, the three steps can be simplified as thus:
For every flow paths in DSM, analyze, identify failures that can appear in each
component, and archive those failures as initiating events; for example, the ex-
emplary DSM has B component, C component, and D component. State sets of
failures that can appear in those three components as: {IEbi}, {IEci} and {IEdi}
and use those sets of initiating events to iterate through the identified DSM flow
paths to reveal middle states ({MSi}), and end states ({ESi}).
First iteration
Identify effects of {IEbi} on its subsequent component, archive those effects as
mid states ({MSci}; then identify effects of {MSci} on subsequent component.
For example, identify effects of {IEbi} on C, archive those effects as middle states
({MSci}) at C-component level of the flow path; then, identify effects of the mid
states ({MSci} on D component. The effects of {MSci} on D component can be
archived as end states ({ES1di}).
Second iteration
Identify the effect of {IEci} on D component in the flow path and archive them
as end states ({ES2di}).
Third iteration
The failure that appear in component D can be archived as end state ({ES3di})
since it is last component in the flow path. These steps can be used to identify
{IEi}, {MSi}, and {ESi} in n-component flow path of DSM matrix:
A → B → · · · → N.
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This method of using DSM to predict failures has potential of predicting all pos-
sible system failures when resources that flow through each path of a system
represented in DSM matrix are considered.
A.5 Transformation Method
Transformation method is a method that is used to transform design matrix
(DM)of axiomatic design to design structure matrix (DSM). This method is very
important to understand and apply AFD-3 method to risk analysis, which is the
reason it is re-emphasized on in this appendix. Tranformation of DM to DSM
involves three important steps which are illustrated in the following using DM
matrix.
DP1 DP2 DP3
FR1 X O X
FR2 O X X
FR3 X X O
First step: choose output variables in DM matrix such that one output variable
occupies one row and one column of a DM matrix. For example, the output
variables are chosen in the DM matrix as shown below.
DP1 DP2 DP3
FR1 X O X
FR2 O X X
FR3 X X O
Second step: Perform row permutation on the DM matrix (with chosen output
variables) in such a way that chosen output variables occupy diagonal of DSM
matrix. For example, permutation matrix for above DM matrix is shown below.
PermutationMatrix =

0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0

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Third step: Permute the rows of the DM matrix by multiplying columns of DM
matrix (with chosen output variables) with rows of permutation matrix. This is
expressed in equation 3.11.
DP1 DP2 DP3
DP1 X X O
DP2 O X X
DP3 X O X
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B.1 Code Used for Simulation
% A piece of code used to simulate singular modularity equation.
% It is just implemented to test SMI model ,
% not to be used as software for solving industry problem.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <math.h>
#define SIZE 2000
#define ZERO 0
#define ONE 1
#define OUTPUT printf
#define INPUT scanf
#define HOLD_MATISSA float
#define HOLD_INT int
int main() {
HOLD_MATISSA E_VALUE[SIZE] = {0.00};
HOLD_MATISSA S_VALUE[SIZE] = {0.00};
HOLD_MATISSA D_VALUE[SIZE] = {0.00};
HOLD_MATISSA ARRAY[SIZE] = {0.00};
HOLD_MATISSA CUMU = 0.000;
HOLD_MATISSA ARGMIN[SIZE];
HOLD_INT i = ZERO;
HOLD_INT j = ZERO;
HOLD_INT COUNTER = ZERO;
HOLD_INT MATRIX_SIZE = ZERO;
HOLD_INT ALPHA = ZERO;
OUTPUT ("\n MATRIX SIZE :");
INPUT ("%i",& MATRIX_SIZE );
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for (i = ONE; i <= MATRIX_SIZE; i++){
OUTPUT ("\t");
OUTPUT ("S[%d]:", i);
INPUT ("%f", &E_VALUE[i]);
++ COUNTER;
(S_VALUE[i]= (pow(E_VALUE[i] ,0.5)));
}
// sorting of the matrix in ascending order.
for(i=ONE;i< COUNTER;i++) {
for(j=ZERO;j< COUNTER -1;j++)
if(S_VALUE[j]>S_VALUE[j+1])
{
// double temp = ZERO;
HOLD_MATISSA temp=S_VALUE[j];
S_VALUE[j]= S_VALUE[j+1];
S_VALUE[j+1]= temp;
}
}
// OUTPUT (" \n %f", S_VALUE [1]);
// OUTPUT (" \n %f", S_VALUE [2]);
// OUTPUT (" \n %f", S_VALUE [3]);
// OUTPUT (" \n %f \n", S_VALUE [4]);
// Implementation of Singular Modularity Index
OUTPUT ("ALPHA SIZE :"); // Number of step of alpha
INPUT ("%d", &ALPHA);
for(i = ZERO; i < ALPHA; ++i){
OUTPUT ("ALPHA [%d]:", i);
INPUT ("%f", &ARRAY[i]);
}
for(i = ZERO; i < ALPHA; ++i){
CUMU = 0.00;
for (j = ONE; j <= COUNTER; ++j){
HOLD_MATISSA CONST = S_VALUE[j]/ S_VALUE[COUNTER ];
HOLD_MATISSA EXP = exp(-(j-1)/ ARRAY[i]);
if ((CONST -EXP) < ZERO){
CUMU+= (( -1.00)*( CONST -EXP ));
}
else{
CUMU +=(CONST -EXP);
}
}
ARGMIN[i] = CUMU;
}
for(j = ZERO; j < ALPHA; ++ j){
OUTPUT ("\n ARGMIN [%d]: ", j);
OUTPUT ("%f", ARGMIN[j]);
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}
OUTPUT ("\n\n");
system ("pause ");
return(ZERO);
}
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